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SUBTLE HAZARDS, FINANCIAL RISKS, AND DIVERSIFIED
BANKS: AN ESSAY ON THE PERILS OF
REGULATORY REFORM
HELEN A. GARTEN*
INTRODUCTION
Deregulation has put proponents of business regulation on the
defensive. Today, economic regulation must be justified by refer-
ence to convincing evidence of dysfunction in unregulated markets;
otherwise, its interference with competitive market forces is consid-
ered unnecessary or even counterproductive.' Yet, when regulation
has dominated an industry for a long period of time, the case for or
against regulation may be difficult to make. Defenders of regulation
can point to the hazards that the original regulatory program was
designed to address, but, years later, the regulated business may
have changed so completely that stories of past abuses by an unreg-
ulated industry take on a legendary quality. On the other hand, the
consequences of sudden deregulation of an industry that has grown
up with and has been shaped by regulation are so unpredictable,
and potentially so destabilizing, as to discourage total demolition of
existing regulatory structures.' The result often is a compromise,
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law at Newark. A.B.,
Princeton University, 1975; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1978. I am grateful to the
Rutgers University Research Council for its grant support for this project, and to the S.I.
Newhouse Faculty Research Fund of the Rutgers Law School for its ongoing assistance.
A version of this Article was presented at the meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools Section on Financial Institutions and Consumer Financial Services in New
Orleans, Louisiana, on January 7, 1989.
1. For this approach to testing regulation, see S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS RE-
FORM (1982). Some justifications for regulation may seem to have little to do with cor-
recting market failure. For example, regulation requiring banks to serve the credit
needs of their local communities would seem to reflect social policy rather than effi-
ciency. Nevertheless, justification of this policy ultimately involves addressing such is-
sues as the competitiveness of the market for financial services and existing incentives
for financial institutions to fill this potential gap in service. In other words, most justifi-
cations for regulation may be phrased in terms of market failure, depending on one's
vision of the efficiency of the market. Id. at 32-35.
2. A rare example of radical deregulation, and its sobering consequences, was "Big
Bang," the wholesale deregulation of London's securities markets in October 1986.
Although the dismantling of the old regulation was accompanied by the creation of al-
ternative regulatory controls, industry problems in adapting to sudden change led to
dislocations and business failures. Duffy, Is the Bloom Off the Rose?, Am. Banker, Dec. 18,
1987, at 5, col. 1. Of course, any regulatory change is likely to have a negative effect on
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involving refurbishing of existing regulatory controls, which is un-
satisfactory both to proponents and to opponents of deregulation.
This dilemma of regulatory reform is illustrated by recent at-
tempts to deregulate the banking industry, and, in particular, to per-
mit greater bank diversification into nonbanking businesses.
Changes in the nature of and demand for banking services have af-
fected the ability of banks and other financial services providers to
operate within the confines of traditional regulation that restricts
the permissible activities and investments of depository institu-
tions.' Regulation such as the Glass-Steagall Act,4 which prevents
banks from engaging in most aspects of the securities business, has
few defenders today.5 In fact, most observers agree that greater di-
versification theoretically may result in more profitable banks,
6
particular groups that acted in reliance on the old regulation. These individual losses
generally are dealt with by specific transition rules, such as grandfathering or phase-ins,
or by market mechanisms. For an analysis of these kinds of transition policies, see
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986) (preferring
market mechanisms). Cf Breyer, Reforming Regulation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1984) (prefer-
ring government-provided transition relief). The transition problems that are of con-
cern in this Article, however, are not those of compensating victims of changes in
regulatory policy, but those of predicting the ability of the new policy to achieve its
desired goals, For example, if there is a significant risk that the new regulatory policy
may fail to create gains for the very groups that it is designed to benefit, then the case
for regulatory change is weakened.
3. For my analysis of these changes in the banking business and their implications
for bank regulatory strategy, see Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank
Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501 (1989).
4. The Glass-Steagall Act is the popular name for §§ 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Bank-
ing Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C.). The Act was adopted in the wake of the banking panic of the late
1920s and early 1930s, when Congress sought to correct abuses within the financial
community by creating a "wall" between the investment and commercial banking indus-
tries. Banks generally may not invest in or underwrite corporate securities. 12 U.S.C.
§ 24, seventh (1988). Banks may not affiliate with securities firms. Id. § 377. Securities
firms may not engage in the business of deposit-taking. Id. § 378. Bank directors, of-
ficers, and employees may not serve as directors, officers, or employees of securities
firms. Id. § 78. Portions of the wall created by the Glass-Steagall Act have been scaled
from time to time by both the banking and securities industries. See, e.g., Securities In-
dus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 68-69 (2d Cir.)
(Glass-Steagall Act does not prohibit bank affiliates from underwriting and dealing in
limited amounts'of securities), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2830 (1988); see also infra text ac-
companying notes 147-160.
5. See, e.g., Trigaux, Corrigan Endorses Proxmire-Garn Bill, Am. Banker, Dec. 11, 1987,
at 3, col. 2 (President of New York Federal Reserve Bank favors securities powers for
banks).
6. Proponents of portfolio theory have suggested that combining banking and se-
curities activities actually may reduce risk within financial institutions. See Note, Restric-
tions on Bank Underwriting of Corporate Securities: A Proposal for More Permissive Regulation, 97
HARV. L. REV. 720, 729 (1984).
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more satisfied customers,7 and a more competitive financial services
industry.8
Yet to advocate repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, or other re-
strictions on the ability of banks to diversify,9 begs the question of
the terms on which deregulation should occur. If the theory behind
restrictive regulation-that certain hazards are created when deposi-
tory institutions engage in investment banking or other nonbanking
activities'°-is still valid, but the regulatory solution-to bar banks
completely from nonbanking businesses-is too broad, then dereg-
ulation will require the substitution of more narrowly drawn con-
trols to address those hazards. If both the form and function of
existing regulation are faulty, then total regulatory dismantling may
proceed without fear of adverse effects that ultimately may require
new regulation.
Predicting the likely consequences of deregulation, however,
has proved almost impossible. Defenders of restrictions on bank di-
versification cite the abuses that occurred prior to the adoption of
regulation," but this type of argument is at best anecdotal. Banks
have been subject to extensive regulation of their day-to-day busi-
ness activities and investments for so long that this regulation actu-
ally has shaped their structure, operating policies, and corporate
culture. 1 2 The banking industry of today is so different, due in large
part to regulation, that it is impossible to imagine a return to prer-
egulatory days, even if all regulatory restrictions suddenly were
removed.
Critics of regulation face the same problem in making their
7. See, e.g., Neustadt, Big Banks Make Gains Placing Corporate Paper, Am. Banker, Dec.
6, 1988, at 1, col. 4 (corporations use banks, as well as investment banks, to place their
commercial paper to gain access to a different group of investors).
8. See Rosenstein, Greenspan Urges Expanded Powers to Help US Banks in Global Markets,
Am. Banker, June 15, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
9. For a description of these other restrictions, see infra text accompanying notes
19-23.
10. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
468 U.S. 137, 144 (1984) (Glass-Steagall Act "responded to the opinion, widely ex-
pressed at the time, that much of the financial difficulty experienced by banks could be
traced to their involvement in investment-banking activities").
11. Much of modern federal banking regulation dates from the Depression. See
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (containing Glass-Steagall Act and Federal Deposit In-
surance Act)). Subsequent regulation has extended federal oversight and control over
bank investments and activities. See, e.g., Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L.
No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988)
(federal regulation of holding companies and affiliates of banks)).
12. See Garten, supra note 3, at 509-21.
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case. Efforts to measure empirically the consequences of permitting
banks to engage in securities, financial, or industrial activities have
been frustrated by the absence of recent experience with bank diver-
sification into these businesses. Although some proponents of de-
regulation rely on portfolio theory to predict the effect of combining
banking and nonbanking activities,'" portfolio theory can predict
only the effect of combining a portfolio of banking and nonbanking
stocks, which has little application to actual entry by banks into non-
banking businesses.' 4 Moreover, evidence based on experience with
diversified nonbank conglomerates suggests that when corporations
attempt to reduce risk by diversifying their businesses, they simply
are not as successful as individual portfolio investors.15 These
problems in testing the consequences of diversification have stymied
attempts to make a definitive case for deregulation.
This Article addresses this dilemma of anticipating the conse-
quences of regulatory change by re-examining the case for deregu-
lation of banking. Part I evaluates the theoretical arguments for and
against permitting greater bank diversification. This debate has
proved inconclusive because of disagreement over the likely impact
of deregulation on the banking industry, consumers, competitors,
and the banking system. More generally, simply arguing about
whether any hazards will result from deregulation is futile unless
some agreement is reached as to why such hazards should be taken
seriously in determining the future of bank regulation.
Part II describes three hazards to the banking system that may
accompany removal of regulatory restrictions on bank diversifica-
tion and explains why they should be taken seriously in fashioning
regulatory reform. These new subtle hazards' 6 of deregulation are
the hazard of inefficient diversification, the hazard of inefficient
funding, and the hazard of inefficient management. These hazards
differ in two respects from the harms that usually are cited to justify
13. See supra note 6 and infra text accompanying notes 120-125.
14. For a discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 126-140.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 141-146.
16. The phrase "subtle hazards" has special meaning for bank regulation because it
was used by the Supreme Court in Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630
(1971), to characterize the dangers that arise when banks diversify into the securities
business. The Court may have adopted the phrase from Senator Bulkley's testimony in
support of the Glass-Steagall Act, which stressed the need for banking laws to prevent
risks that may be "so subtle as not to be easily recognized." 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932).
Although the subtle hazards discussed in this Article are somewhat different from those
described by the Court and Senator Bulkley, the phrase is descriptive of the harms that
may result from the deregulatory process and that may go unrecognized in the haste to
detail the defects of existing regulation.
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restrictions on bank diversification. First, they involve general
problems of organization, structure, and management rather than
specific conflicts of interest and other opportunistic behavior on the
part of individual bank managers. Second, their impact on the
banking system is likely to be far more serious and less easily solved
by either legal rules or competitive market forces.
Part III returns to the problem \of testing the effects of regula-
tory change by demonstrating how disagreement over the likely re-
sults of bank deregulation is shaping the process of regulatory
reform. Most reform proposals reflect an uneasy compromise be-
tween advocates of unfettered diversification and those who believe
that the combination of banking and nonbanking businesses in a
single entity creates the potential for risky or anticompetitive prac-
tices. For example, recent legislative and regulatory initiatives per-
mit banks to enter new businesses, but only through separately
incorporated affiliates isolated from the bank itself by regulatory
"firewalls."' 7  In theory, these firewalls prevent interactions be-
tween banking and nonbanking operations that may give rise to po-
tential hazards. Inevitably, the lack of consensus as to what these
hazards are, and what dangers they pose to the banking system, has
led to disagreement over the proper height and breadth of the
firewalls.' 8 More generally, firewalls do not address the real hazards
of organization, funding, and management that are likely to result
from bank diversification.
Finally, Part IV proposes a transitional approach to regulatory
reform that permits banks to diversify by making minority equity in-
vestments in nonbanking firms. Such investments enable banks to
take advantage of any risk-reducing effect of diversification while
sharing the organizational, funding, and management risks of inte-
grating banking and nonbanking operations. Moreover, unlike
firewalls, this approach allows easy transition to full deregulation
17. See, e.g., Financial Modernization Act of 1988, S. 1886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.,
134 CONG. REC. S3369-72 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988) (proposing amendment to Bank
Holding Company Act to permit banks to own securities affiliates insulated from the
bank by firewalls). Although recent attempts to legislate firewalls have been unsuccess-
ful, the federal bank regulators have exercised their discretion to permit banks to com-
mence certain new nonbanking activities conditioned on the building of very similar
firewalls. See infra text accompanying notes 313-326.
18. Efforts to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act have foundered over disagreement be-
tween the Senate and House as to the necessary firewalls. See Depository Institutions
Act of 1988, H.R. 5094, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (requiring additional firewalls
between banks and securities affiliates not contained in Senate bill); see also infra text
accompanying notes 335-336.
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should experience prove today's concerns over the hazards of diver-
sification to have been exaggerated.
I. THE DILEMMA OF REGULATORY REFORM
Perhaps the best known, yet least understood, provisions of
modern banking regulation are the restrictions on bank diversifica-
tion into nonbanking businesses. As with much of bank regulation,
restrictions on diversification stem from numerous sources in the
banking laws and affect banks in various ways. The Glass-Steagall
Act restricts bank entry into many aspects of the securities business,
either directly- or through affiliation with investment banking
firms."9 The laws of the various bank chartering authorities 20 gener-
ally bar banks from engaging in commercial activities and even some
financial businesses, such as insurance. 2' The federal Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 restricts the permissible activities of bank
holding companies and their nonbank affiliates to activities that are
"so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as
to be a proper incident thereto."22 These activities include deposit-
taking and lending and various related activities, but not general
commercial, industrial, or nonbank financial businesses.2 3
Of course, these restrictions on diversification are not airtight.
Some states expressly permit their banks to engage in nonbank ac-
tivities that are forbidden to national banks and even bank holding
company affiliates.24 The Bank Holding Company Act gives the
19. See supra note 4.
20. Banks may be chartered by the Comptroller of the Currency, in which case they
become subject to the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1988), or by the banking
authorities in the state in which they are located, in which case they become subject to
state banking laws.
21. The National Bank Act specifies the powers of national banks; these powers do
not include commercial activities and include only limited insurance activities. Id. § 24;
id. § 92 (limited power to act as insurance agent or broker in communities with 5000 or
fewer inhabitants). Although the laws of the various states differ as to permissible bank-
ing powers, state banks generally are limited to traditional deposit-taking, lending, and
trust activities. A few states permit additional nonbanking activities, such as insurance.
See, e.g., Robinson, California Banks Win Insurance Powers, Am. Banker, Nov. 10, 1988, at 2,
col. 2.
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
23. Regulation Y of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System lists ac-
tivities that are permissible for nonbank affiliates, including consumer and commercial
finance, trust functions, investment advice, data processing, and selling some forms of
credit life insurance. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1989). Activities that currently are impermis-
sible for nonbank affiliates include general insurance activities, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)
(1988), management consulting, 12 C.F.R. § 225.126(f) (1989), and oil and gas activi-
ties, Republic National Bank of Dallas, 59 Fed. Res. Bull. 768, 769 (1973).
24. See supra note 21.
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Federal Reserve Board discretion to determine what businesses are
permissible for nonbank affiliates of banks.25 These businesses are
as diverse as discount brokerage and leasing computer time.26 Even
the Glass-Steagall Act has been interpreted to permit banks to en-
gage through affiliates in underwriting and dealing in corporate
debt and equity securities, municipal revenue bonds,28 mortgage-
backed securities, 29 and commercial paper," at least on a limited
basis. In fact, the argument may be made that the only remaining
barrier to diversification is the need to obtain regulatory approval
and defend against the inevitable legal challenges of nonbank
competitors.3 1
Still, restrictions on diversification have had a lingering impact
on the banking industry. By limiting management's choices with re-
spect to investment in and use of assets, the restrictions have greatly
intruded into the day-to-day operations of banks and have pro-
foundly influenced the development of the modem banking indus-
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988). The Board is precluded by statute from permit-
ting nonbank affiliates to engage in certain insurance activities. Id.
26. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.125 (1989).
27. See J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., Chase Manhattan Corp., Bankers Trust New York Corp.,
Citicorp and Security Pacific Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192, 213 (1989) [hereinafter Bank
Underwriting Decision]. The authority for permitting this and other underwriting is § 20
of the Glass-Steagall Act, which bars banks from affiliating with firms "engaged princi-
pally" in the securities business. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988). So long as bank securities
affiliates limit their underwriting and dealing in corporate debt and equity and other
"ineligible securities" (securities that the Glass-Steagall Act does not permit banks
themselves to underwrite) to a specific percentage of the affiliate's gross revenues (cur-
rently ten percent), the affiliate is not considered by the Federal Reserve Board to be
"engaged principally" in impermissible securities activities.
28. See Citicorp, J.P. Morgan & Co.; Inc. and Bankers Trust New York Corp., 73 Fed. Res.
Bull. 473, 502-03 (1987), aff'd sub nom. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers
Trust]. The Glass-Steagall Act itself permits banks to underwrite and deal in United
States government securities, general obligation bonds issued by states and municipali-
ties, and certain other governmental agency securities. 12 U.S.C. § 24, seventh (1988).
29. See Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra note 28, at 473.
30. See id.
31. The cost of this process is significant. Many recent legal challenges to regulatory
approvals of new bank powers have found their way to the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137
(1984) (commercial paper placement); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207 (1984) (discount brokerage). Moreover, in approv-
ing applications to diversify, the bank regulators have placed significant restrictions on
operations, including limits on interaffiliate funding and other dealings between bank
and nonbank affiliates. See, e.g., Bank Underwriting Decision, supra note 27, at 206-07 (for-
bidding bank from extending credit to securities affiliate). In the absence of the Glass-
Steagall Act and other legal limits on bank diversification, these restrictions would be
more difficult for the regulators to impose and enforce.
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try. As regulation has forced banks to serve primarily as lenders of
deposits, this has shaped public perception of the bank's proper role
and responsibilities. Banks are considered the ultimate source of
credit for industry, particularly in times when other sources of credit
are unavailable.32 This view of the "proper function" of banks is
reflected in various regulatory and governmental policies, such as
the Community Reinvestment Act, which makes consideration of a
bank's record in meeting the credit needs of its local community a
factor in approving applications for expansion.3 3 It also has influ-
enced the management philosophy and style of most bankers. 4
Thus, the modern commercial banking industry has matured apart
from the rest of the financial services industry. 5
In addition, despite numerous assaults, remaining restrictions
on bank diversification have proved remarkably impervious, particu-
larly to congressional attack. Regulation of bank liabilities, such as
ceilings on the rates of interest payable on bank deposits, has been
almost completely dismantled.3 1 Yet attempts to repeal asset re-
strictions have failed. 7 In fact, over the past decade, Congress actu-
ally tightened, rather than loosened, restrictions on bank
diversification, first, by restricting bank insurance activities, 38 and
second, by preventing commercial and industrial companies from
setting up limited purpose deposit-taking institutions.3 9
Today, however, the viability of the remaining restrictions on
bank diversification is subject to question. Banks have faced serious
competitive pressures and have experienced lower earnings in their
traditional lending business. The development of active trading
32. For a description of this role of banks as back-up sources of liquidity for the
credit markets, see Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, FED. RESERVE BANK MINNEAPOLIS ANN.
REP. 1, 9-11 (1982).
33. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1988).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 272-276.
35. The impact of the bank's peculiar corporate culture on recent efforts by banks to
diversify is explained infra text accompanying notes 268-288.
36. See 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1988) (deregulating rates of interest payable on time
deposits).
37. For example, in 1988, Congress again tried-and failed-to repeal the Glass-
Steagall Act. See Garsson, Proxmire: Securities Bill Dead, Am. Banker, Oct. 21, 1988, at 1,
col. 2.
38. See Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1969 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)). The amendment restricted the authority
of bank holding companies to engage in insurance activities through nonbank affiliates.
39. See Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101(a), 101
Stat. 552, 554 (1987) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 184 1(c) (amending definition of "bank" in
Bank Holding Company Act to include insured, limited purpose deposit-taking
institutions)).
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markets for short-term debt instruments, such as commercial paper,
has provided an alternative to bank loans for most corporate bor-
rowers. Banks have experienced the shrinking of their traditional
customer base.4 °
Regulatory changes also have made the lending business less
attractive. Banks no longer are subject to ceilings on the rates of
interest that they may pay on deposits.4 ' This deregulation enables
banks to compete for funds with high yield investments such as
money market mutual funds,4 2 but it also results in narrower
spreads between the rates of interest that banks earn on their assets
and the rates that they pay on their liabilities. In addition, regula-
tion requiring higher bank capital to asset ratios4 3 has made lending
more expensive. Every additional dollar of loans requires a corre-
sponding increase in capital.
These market and regulatory changes have fueled arguments
for permitting greater diversification. So long as the lending busi-
ness guaranteed high rates of return and relatively little risk, banks
had no need or desire to enter other businesses. 44 The case for di-
versification recently has become more appealing. The principal ad-
vantage of diversification is that, in theory, combining banking and
selected nonbanking activities may reduce overall risk. Portfolio
theory suggests that a securities investor can reduce portfolio risk by
purchasing securities whose returns are negatively correlated. At
any given time, poor returns on one investment should be offset by
high returns on other investments, reducing the variability of port-
folio earnings as a whole.4 5 If a portfolio investor can reduce risk by
diversifying investments, the same achievement may be possible for
40. For a discussion of these trends, see Garten, supra note 3, at 521-28.
41. See supra note 36.
42. For a description of the phenomenal growth of these funds as investment alter-
natives to bank deposits, see J. AUERBACH & S. HAYES, INVESTMENT BANKING AND DILI-
GENCE: WHAT PRICE DEREGULATION? 92-94 (1986).
43. By the end of 1992, banks must maintain a capital to risk-weighted assets ratio of
at least eight percent, of which four percent must consist of equity. See Federal Reserve
System Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4186 (1989) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 208, 225).
44. This apparently was the case until the 1970s. See, e.g., Rhoades, A Comparative
Investigation of Risk and Rates of Return in Commercial Banking and Manufacturing Industries, 25
ANTITRUST BULL. 589 (Fall 1980). Rhoades compared average rates of return on equity
and variability in rates of return for the banking and various nonbanking industries in
the 1960s. He found that banking was just as profitable as, but less risky than, most
nonbanking activities, and concluded that banking organizations would benefit from in-
creasing banking rather than nonbanking assets. Id. at 617.
45. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 123-26 (2d ed.
1984).
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a banking organization by diversifying its businesses. For example,
if banking returns negatively correlate with investment banking re-
turns, the risk-reducing effect that is achieved by an investor who
buys the stock of Chase and Merrill Lynch may be duplicated by
Chase if it conducts a securities business, either by buying Merrill
Lynch or starting its own.4 6
This argument for permitting banks to diversify is not new.
Prior to the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, bankers cited the risk-
reducing effects of diversification as one reason for their formation
of securities affiliates.47 Yet Congress decided to limit bank diversi-
fication. What then, if anything, did Congress know that the bank-
ers did not?
A. The Problem With Investment Company Institute v. Camp
Justifications for regulatory restrictions on bank diversification
find their philosophical antecedents in the Supreme Court opinion
in Investment Company Institute v. Camp.48 At first, this reliance on
Camp seems misplaced. The Camp decision involved an interpreta-
tion of a particular provision of the Glass-Steagall Act,4 9 and did not
address the more general restrictions on bank diversification into
commercial activities contained in the Bank Holding Company Act
and other banking laws.5" Moreover, Camp was decided in 1971, al-
most forty years after passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, 5' in a pro-
foundly different banking and regulatory environment.
46. This argument ignores the possibility that diversification by a business such as
Chase is a different and more costly process than portfolio diversification by an individ-
ual securities investor. For a discussion of these problems with portfolio theory as ap-
plied to conglomerate diversification, see infra text accompanying notes 126-146.
47. See, e.g., Wilkinson, Bank Security Companies, 119 BANKERS MAG. 927, 929 (1929)
(bank entry into investment banking can minimize fluctuations in earning power).
48. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
49. Specifically, the case involved a challenge to a regulation of the Comptroller of
the Currency permitting national banks to operate collective investment funds. Id. at
618-19. The Supreme Court interpreted the Glass-Steagall Act's restrictions on bank
issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing securities to cover the operation of such a
fund. Id. at 639.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
51. In view of the number of recent cases involving interpretation of Glass-Steagall,
it is noteworthy that between 1933, when the statute was enacted, and 1971, the year of
the Camp decision, the Supreme Court interpreted the Act only once, focusing on the
meaning of the phrase "primarily engaged" in securities activities, and did not consider
generally the purposes of the Act. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Ag-
new, 329 U.S. 441,445-49 (1947). The explanation may be that, prior to the 1970s, the
profitability of the traditional banking business removed incentives for banks to test the
limits of the statutory restrictions on bank securities activities. See Garten, supra note 3,
at 518-19.
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Nevertheless, for two reasons, the Camp analysis has proved ex-
tremely influential in setting the perimeters of the debate over bank
diversification. First, the hazards identified by Camp as resulting
from the combination of banking and securities activities may arise
when banks engage in nonbanking activities of any sort. The temp-
tation for a bank to utilize its lending facilities to support its non-
banking operations 52 may be just as strong whether those
nonbanking operations are investment banking or shoe sales.53
Thus, consideration of the costs and benefits of bank entry into any
new nonbanking activity generally makes reference to the so-called
Camp subtle hazards.54
Second, the Camp opinion articulated what now is the classic
justification for regulatory interference with competitive market
forces. According to Camp, the Glass-Steagall Act reflected a legisla-
tive determination that "policies of competition, convenience, or ex-
pertise which might otherwise support the entry of commercial
banks into the investment banking business were outweighed by the
'hazards' and 'financial dangers' that arise when commercial banks
engage in the activities proscribed by the Act." '5 5 In fact, this bal-
ancing probably was not necessary in 1933, when the Glass-Steagall
Act was passed. The decline in the market for new securities issues
following the stock market crash and the subsequent regulation of
the securities markets led most banks voluntarily to abandon invest-
ment banking.56
This weighing of the costs of regulatory interference with com-
petitive market forces against the harms produced by an unregu-
lated market had more significance in 1971, when the financial
products market was experiencing profound changes. As banks
faced serious competition from nonbank providers of financial serv-
ices and customers began to demand new and better financial prod-
ucts, the effect of restrictive regulation on financial innovation
became an issue for the first time in forty years.57 Recognition of
52. See Camp, 401 U.S. at 631 (describing the "natural temptation [for the bank] to
shore up the affiliate through unsound loans or other aid").
53. The motive for such cross-funding, according to Camp, is the fear that, because of
the close association of the bank and its nonbank affiliate in the public mind, "should the
affiliate fare badly, public confidence in the bank might be impaired." Id. at 631.
54. See, e.g., American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav.
Ass'n, 38'5 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (bank entry into travel agency business
could create pressures for bank to "prime the pump" of the travel industry by making
substandard loans to its travel agency customers).
55. 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971).
56. See Garten, supra note 3, at 514-16.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
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the cost of bank regulation in terms of its interference with benefi-
cial operations of the market is a relatively recent phenomenon.
What hazards did Camp say may arise from bank diversification
into securities activities? Curiously, the Camp decision did not
spend much time on the most obvious hazard, that banks may invest
depositors' money in risky securities." Rather, Camp identified cer-
tain "more subtle hazards" that arise when banks engage in the in-
vestment banking business.59 For example, since the bank and its
securities operations are linked in the public mind, losses in those
securities operations may lead to a loss of confidence in the bank
itself.6 ° This in turn may tempt the bank to provide funds to shore
up its troubled securities operations.6" Alternatively, the bank may
assist its securities operations indirectly by lowering its credit stan-
dards to lend to underwriting clients to support their securities
62issues.
In addition, bank depositors may blame the bank for losses on
securities purchased from its securities operation, thereby damaging
the bank's reputation. 63 The promotional demands of the invest-
ment banking business may cause banks to "lend their reputation
for prudence and restraint" to the business of selling securities, 64
and to let their promotional interest in particular securities color
their disinterested investment advice to bank customers.65 Banks
also may dump unsold securities in their discretionary trust
accounts.66
Almost all of these so-called "subtle hazards" involve some
58. The specific securities activity at issue in the Camp case-operating a collective
investment fund-did not involve the direct investment of bank assets in securities. The
Supreme Court did note that, prior to the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, most banks
conducted their securities activities through separately incorporated affiliates that did
not have access to bank assets. Camp, 401 U.S. at 630. Nevertheless, before Glass-Stea-
gall, banks, particularly small banks, were major buyers of securities, often from the
securities affiliates of their large correspondent banks. See 75 CONG. REC. 9911 (1932)
(statement of Sen. Bulkley) (country's bank correspondents were "overloaded with a
mass of investments").
59. 401 U.S. at 630 (Congress focused on the "more subtle hazards that arise when a
commercial bank . . . enters the investment banking business").
60. Id. at 631.
61. Id.
62. The bank's "salesman's interest" in promoting particular securities may "impair
its ability to function as an impartial source of credit." Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 632. The bank also may be tempted to make imprudent loans to bank
customers to finance their purchases of stock. Id.
65. Id. at 633.
66. Id.
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form of conflict of interest.67 The principal concern raised by these
conflicts is not the possibility of unfairness to bank customers, but
the likely impact on the bank itself. According to Camp, the danger
created by these specific abuses is that they lead to public dissatis-
faction with and loss of confidence in banks. This loss of confidence
presumably may cause depositors to withdraw their funds from the
banking system, resulting in the failure of many banks. In fact, bank
managers' fear that losses in bank securities operations will cause
the public to lose confidence in the bank provides the motive to en-
gage in abusive practices, such as making preferential loans to un-
derwriting clients to support their securities issues and pushing
those securities on unsuspecting bank customers.68 These prac-
tices, if they became known, would only further impair depositors'
trust in their banks.
As an accurate statement of the real motives behind the Glass-
Steagall Act, the Camp subtle hazards are somewhat suspect. Critics
of the Glass-Steagall Act have noted the danger of confusing appar-
ent legislative intent with the true motives of Congress in adopting
legislation.69 These critics argue that the hazards identified in Camp
as arising from bank involvement in securities activities do not pro-
vide an adequate explanation of the Act's complete separation of
the banking and investment banking businesses, since conflicts of
interest may be prevented by less intrusive regulation.70 Thus, the
real reason for the Act's separation of banking and securities may
have been something quite different. For example, a possible mo-
tive for the Glass-Steagall Act may have been the congressional de-
sire in 1933 to protect investment bankers by removing commercial
bankers from their turf.7 ' In fact, the banks themselves shared in
the spoils of Glass-Steagall, since by 1933 they had reason to aban-
don the securities business voluntarily and return to traditional
banking.7" For almost three decades thereafter, the commercial
67. See Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of
the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 689-90 (1987).
68. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 631-32 (1971).
69. See, e.g., Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Di-
lemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 2 (1984); see also Posner, Economics, Politics, and the
Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 272 (1982).
70. See Langevoort, supra note 67, at 690.
71. See Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4,
57 (1984); Macey, supra note 69, at 16-19. But see Langevoort, supra note 67, at 697
(arguing that real motive was to redirect banking energies to traditional commercial and
agricultural lending).
72. See supra text accompanying note 56. If banks wanted to cut expenses by termi-
nating employees of their unprofitable securities businesses, the divestiture of securities
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banker's protected turf was far more profitable than the investment
banker's.73
Although the problem of deciphering the legislative intent of
the Glass-Steagall Act is primarily of judicial concern, 4 the Camp
hazards also have colored the debate over legislative reform. If
Camp accurately summarizes the likely consequences of allowing
banks to engage in securities and other nonbanking activities, then
it provides a starting point for discussion of regulatory policy with
respect to bank diversification. Yet the Camp hazards have proved
unhelpful even for this purpose. Camp assumed that losses in bank
securities operations cause depositors to lose confidence in their
banks and withdraw their funds, leading to liquidity crises and bank
failure. 75 This danger may lead banks to make imprudent loans and
take other steps to ensure the success of their securities operations.
Risky loans and other questionable practices may themselves result
in losses for the bank and impair public confidence. Thus, bank se-
curities activities are of regulatory concern because they may lead to
loss of depositor confidence in banks, bank runs, and bank
failures.76
This justification for regulatory intervention seems unconvinc-
ing today. Since 1933, public confidence in the banking system has
been sustained not by the Glass-Steagall Act, but by the deposit in-
surance system, which was created by the same comprehensive
banking legislation that produced the Glass-Steagall Act. 77 The
existence of deposit insurance makes the scenario suggested in
Camp, that losses in bank securities activities will lead to large scale
deposit outflows, more difficult to accept. Most fully insured depos-
itors have little reason to expend much time or money to monitor
the performance of their bank's securities division. Even if losses in
operations forced by the Glass-Steagall Act allowed banks to justify their firing of em-
ployees during the Depression. In 1933, Chase terminated over 1000 employees of its
securities affiliate. See Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History,
88 BANKING L.J. 483, 523-24 (1971).
73. See supra text accompanying note 44.
74. For an analysis of how recent reviewing courts have dealt with the Glass-Steagall
Act, see Langevoort, supra note 67, at 698-719.
75. 401 U.S. 617, 631 (1971).
76. The Court did identify other reasons for concern over bank securities activities,
including their contribution to feeding the speculative fever of the late 1920s. Id. When
Camp was decided in 1971, however, this particular danger was no longer a serious
threat. On the other hand, maintaining public confidence in the banking system is an
ongoing problem.
77. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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securities operations lead to bank failure, the deposit insurance fund
will reimburse these depositors in full.7 8 Although uninsured de-
positors may have more reason to be concerned whether securities
losses lead to the failure of their bank, they may be indifferent to or
actually welcome some of the conflicts of interest predicted by Camp
if these conflicts give their bank a competitive advantage.79
Moreover, the kinds of abuses identified by Camp are amenable
to treatment by special conflict of interest rules. Such rules are re-
lied upon to prevent conflicts of interest in diversified nonbank fi-
nancial firms. 8 If similar rules are workable for diversified banking
firms, then the justification given by Camp for the Glass-Steagall Act
begins to fall apart. Post-Camp judicial construction of the Glass-
Steagall Act has struggled with this logical inconsistency created by
Camp. If the only reason for the Act is to prevent the hazards identi-
fied in Camp, yet these hazards can be dealt with by more narrowly
drawn rules, then there is no reason to interpret the Act broadly to
prohibit particular bank securities activities. Thus, most judicial de-
cisions that rely on Camp to interpret the Glass-Steagall Act have
tended to narrow the reach of the statute.8"
78. Many insured and even some uninsured depositors maintain accounts in particu-
lar banks because of convenience, availability of other services, or other reasons that
have little to do with risk and return. Such depositors are less sensitive than typical
securities investors to changes in risk at their banks. See Garten, Banking On the Market:
Relying On Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALEJ. ON REG. 129, 134-37 (1986).
79. Such practices as dumping unsold securities in bank trust accounts may enhance
the profitability of bank securities operations. Although any resulting dissatisfaction on
the part of trust customers could result in the loss of their business, the effect will not be
so sudden or so devastating as to result in the failure of the bank and loss of depositors'
funds. Depositors would have ample opportunity to switch to another bank should any
problems arise. In fact, there is very little evidence that, when and if such abuses did
occur, they caused the failure of a substantial number of banks. The practices of the
bank securities affiliates in the 1920s may have led to the bankruptcy of the affiliates'
customers, but not their affiliated banks. See Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, The Regula-
tion of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 323 n.72 (1987) (suspecting
that bank failures in the 1920s and 1930s were unrelated to investment banking affili-
ates); Garten, supra note 3, at 512 n.52. The failure of the Bank of the United States in
1930, although often blamed on its affiliate system, was caused by insider fraud on the
part of its president. See Perkins, supra note 72, at 496-97.
80. See, e.g., Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securities
Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 459 (1975). Some of the abuses identified in Camp, such as
dumping securities issued by bank clients into trust accounts, already can occur in un-
diversified commercial banks. See Hunsicker, Conflicts of Interest, Economic Distortions, and
the Separation of Trust and Commercial Banking Functions, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 611, 654-55
(1977).
81. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
468 U.S. 207 (1984). In deciding that discount brokerage was not an impermissible
securities activity under the Act, the Supreme Court determined that discount brokerage
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This does not mean that the Camp hazards are irrelevant. The
connection between bank securities activities and public confidence
may be more complex than the Camp opinion suggested. Camp itself
quoted extensively from a lengthy statement as to the purposes of
the Glass-Steagall Act made by Senator Bulkley on the Senate floor
in 1932.82 Senator Bulkley argued that losses in a bank securities
affiliate, even if not severe enough to bring about the failure of the
bank, could so discredit the bank as to impair the confidence of its
depositors.83 Yet he also was concerned about public confidence in
the securities markets, which in his view had been overdeveloped
because of the activities of bank securities affiliates. Once the banks
had developed extensive retail distribution networks for securities,
they had to recoup their costs by insuring a continuous flow of new
issues." This in turn led banks to pressure their underwriting cli-
ents to issue vast quantities of new securities and to create a market
for these securities by lending to securities purchasers and encour-
aging depositors and correspondent banks to invest.8 5 Removing
banks from the securities business would improve the quality of the
securities markets by ensuring that advice on new issues would be
untainted by the banker's stake in promoting an active securities
market.8 6
Senator Bulkley's attempt to blame the excesses of securities
speculation entirely on the commercial banks obviously was over-
stated.87 Nevertheless, the Senator's goal of creating entirely sepa-
rate markets and corporate cultures for commercial banks and
investment banks in fact has been the most significant achievement
would not create the kind of pressures on the bank that would cause it to engage in the
abusive practices described in Camp. Id. at 220 & n.23.
82. See 75 CONG. REC. 9909 (1932). It is unclear if Senator Bulkley's statement accu-
rately reflected the views of either the drafters of the Act or the Congress that subse-
quently passed it. Senator Bulkley indicated that he represented the views of the
subcommittee that had worked on the Glass bill, and at least one fellow senator found
his argument "absolutely invincible." Id. at 9913 (statement of Sen. Vandenberg). Nev-
ertheless, the real reasons for passage of the Act are probably unknowable. See
Langevoort, supra note 67, at 692.
83. 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932).
84. Id. at 9911.
85. Id.
86. "If... the business of originating and underwriting investment securities is con-
fined to houses not engaged in deposit banking, then the extent and the desirability of
new issues will be subjected to an independent and impartial check. This should tend to
restore public confidence." Id. at 9912.
87. In fact, it may give credence to the argument that the motive of Congress in
adopting Glass-Steagall was to assist the traditional investment banks in eliminating
their new, aggressive bank competitors. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
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of the Glass-Steagall Act. As a result of Glass-Steagall, generations
of corporate customers and bankers have viewed issuing corporate
debt and obtaining a bank loan as entirely separate means of financ-
ing, obtained from different financial institutions with very different
attitudes toward pricing of services, client relationships, and credit
analysis .88
Moreover, Senator Bulkley's view of the potential hazards of
bank securities activities offers two significant lessons for recent de-
bate over bank diversification. First, the problems identified by Sen-
ator Bulkley are problems of organization and management of
diverse enterprises. For example, Senator Bulkley argued that the
substantial investment required to set up a securities distribution
network itself can provide incentives for a banking organization to
support its securities operations.89 Whether or not this particular
hazard is a threat today, it is clear that any organizational or mana-
gerial inefficiencies resulting from bank diversification are likely to
be more lasting, and potentially more dangerous, than the specific
abuses identified in Camp.
Second, unlike the Camp hazards, Senator Bulkley's complaints
cannot be easily addressed by rules that prevent conflicts of interest
and other misconduct in diversified firms. This may provide an an-
swer to the nagging question raised by Camp: Why does bank diver-
sification create any greater problems than diversification by any
other financial or nonfinancial company?
B. The Problem with Empirical Testing
Relying on the Camp hazards to make the case for regulation is
insufficient without further demonstration that these hazards, or
other hazards resulting from bank diversification, should be taken
seriously in today's banking market. Proponents of deregulation
face the same problem of proof in arguing for repeal of restrictive
regulation. Proponents of deregulation have not substantiated their
claim that bank diversification will produce a safer banking system,
or at least will not lead to a more dangerous one. Their problem is
that, without any evidence based on real experience, the conse-
quences of bank diversification are impossible to predict. Thus, at-
tempts to test empirically the effects of deregulation have
foundered.
88. One observer has noted that the division between commercial and investment
banking "is a matter of education, training, motivation, and philosophy." Note, Glass-
Steagall: Lest We Forget, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 163, 194 (1983).
89. 75 CONG. REC. 9911 (1932).
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Most studies of bank diversification have attempted to predict
the consequences of allowing banks to enter nonbanking businesses
by creating simulated portfolios of banking and nonbanking compa-
nies and looking at the relative returns on these portfolios.9" These
studies have found that the returns on certain nonbanking activities
are negatively correlated with banking returns.9 They then con-
clude that some diversification may reduce risk in banking
92organizations.
These studies hardly provide a realistic picture of corporate di-
versification. Portfolio studies treat banking and nonbanking activi-
ties as entirely separate investments. When banks actually diversify,
they will be unlikely to treat each new business as a passive invest-
ment in a portfolio of securities. Portfolio studies cannot take into
account individual operating policies, funds allocation, and other
management decisions that may affect the returns on one or more
operations in a diversified banking organization.93 Further, reliance
by most studies on industry-wide data in determining the returns on
banking and nonbanking activities94 obscures the significance of in-
dividual management decisions.95 For example, if independent
mortgage banking companies in general outperform mortgage
banking companies that are affiliated with bank (or nonbank) con-
glomerates, 96 then use of average industry-wide data may not reflect
special managerial problems that are unique to conglomerate
enterprises.
Other tests of the probable effects of bank diversification also
are subject to criticism. Because banks already may diversify
through nonbank affiliates into activities approved by the Federal
90. For two such studies, see Eisemann, Diversification and the Congeneric Bank Holding
Company, 7J. BANK RES. 68 (1976) (comparing stock price and dividend data for selected
banks and nonbanks), and Heggestad, Riskiness of Investments in Nonbank Activities by Bank
Holding Companies, 27 J. EcON. & Bus. 219 (1975) (comparing profitability of banking and
nonbanking industries).
91. See, e.g., Heggestad, supra note 90, at 223 (finding lowest correlation between
banking and real estate returns).
92. See id. at 222-23; Eisemann, supra note 90, at 73-75.
93. For a more detailed explanation of this point, see infra text accompanying notes
261-290.
94. See, e.g., Eisemann, supra note 90, at 70 (using industry-wide data).
95. See, e.g., Heggestad, supra note 90, at 223 (admitting this problem in using indus-
try-wide data).
96. At least one study of bank-affiliated mortgage banking companies has found that
the affiliated companies were less profitable than the industry as a whole. Talley, Bank
Holing Company Performance in Consumer Finance and Mortgage Banking, 52 MAG. BANK AD-
MIN. 42, 44 (1976).
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Reserve Board, 7 studies can measure the actual performance of di-
versified bank holding companies.9" Alternatively, studies can mea-
sure investors' reactions to announcements of bank holding
company acquisitions of new nonbank entities. 9 These studies,
however, have proved inconclusive.' 0 0 This may mean that diversifi-
cation has little or no effect on bank risk. But it also may mean that,
either because of regulation or management choice, banks have not
diversified in a way that leads to risk reduction.10 ' In any case, these
studies cast no light on the possible effects of diversification into
currently forbidden activities.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that diversification
by banks will not be as effective in reducing risk as portfolio diversi-
fication by individual shareholders. Studies of bank holding com-
pany performance in permissible nonbanking activities have found
that nonbank affiliates generally have been less profitable than
either their independent competitors or their sister banks.' 2 Like-
wise, the recent performance of diversified nonbank conglomerates
casts doubt on the beneficial effects of corporate diversification.1
0 3
Thus, the unequivocal benefits of diversification cannot simply be
assumed. Again, consideration of the merits of deregulation stum-
bles against the troubling question of how the consequences of reg-
ulatory change can be measured.
C. Measuring Subtle Hazards
The previous discussion noted the difficulty of proving the case
for or against deregulation. Regulation has restricted bank activities
97. See supra note 25.
98. See, e.g., M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST 77-129 (1977) (comparing a sample of holding company banks with a sample of
independent banks); see also Meinster &Johnson, Bank Holding Company Diversification and
the Risk of Capital Impairment, 10 BELLJ. ECON. 683, 684-88 (1979) (analyzing cash flows
of diversified operations of two bank holding companies).
99. See Wall & Eisenbeis, Risk Considerations in Deregulating Bank Activities, FED. RE-
SERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., May 1984, at 6, 16.
100. For example, a study of bond price movements for 11 banking and nonbanking
firms following their acquisition of a discount broker or other financial services company
found no significant abnormal returns. Id. at 16-17.
101. See Eisemann, supra note 90, at 77 (concluding that bank holding companies have
not been diversifying efficiently). For an explanation of why bank management may not
be effective at efficient diversification, see infra text accompanying notes 120-215.
102. See Talley, supra note 96, at 44 (bank holding company consumer finance and
mortgage banking affiliates).
103. See infra text accompanying notes 144-146. See generally Coffee, Shareholders Versus
Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 52-60 (1986) (describing
recent trend toward "bust-up" takeovers of huge diversified conglomerates).
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for so long that there is no way to demonstrate the likely effect of
permitting bank diversification. Proponents and opponents of de-
regulation end up making contradictory, yet undemonstrable, as-
sumptions about the consequences of bank entry into nonbanking
activities.
Thus, the primary hazard created by deregulation may be the
unpredictability of the consequences of regulatory change. Never-
theless, some assessment of the risks and returns of deregulation is
possible. Although opponents of deregulation have identified many
evils that may follow bank diversification, not every hazard is neces-
sarily of concern to bank regulation. For example, if banks enter the
securities business, some may be unsuccessful and incur losses.
These losses may injure bank stockholders, but shareholders' losses
do not justify continued regulation of bank securities activities.
Guaranteeing returns to bank shareholders is not a goal of bank reg-
ulation. Nevertheless, if as a result of securities activities, half of the
nation's banks fail, these failures would be of regulatory concern.
Depositors' claims would bankrupt the insurance fund, threatening
depositor confidence in the remaining healthy banks, and necessitat-
ing government intervention. Thus, the connection, if any, between
bank securities activities and failure deserves consideration.
The mere possibility that bank securities activities might lead to
bank failure does not prove that such failure is very likely to occur.
Although the impossibility of prediction means that no risk can be
ruled out entirely, not all hazards to the banking system require the
intervention of special bank regulation. There is always a risk that
half of the banks (or nonbanks) in the country suddenly may become
insolvent, creating serious consequences for the economy. But
there are mechanisms that lessen this risk in the majority of cases.
Competitive market forces pressure management to enter new activ-
ities cautiously.10" Conflict of interest rules discourage insider
abuses that lead to failure. If these alternative controls exist and
influence how banks diversify, special bank regulation may not be
necessary.
This suggests the need to re-evaluate the hazards of bank diver-
sification by reference to two guiding principles. First, assessing the
hazards requires consideration of how any particular evil resulting
from diversification interferes with important bank regulatory goals.
104. Theoretically, managers who cause their banks to suffer losses risk losing their
current jobs as well as the chance of being offered better jobs at other firms. Cf Fama,
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON. 288, 289 (1980) (significance of
the managerial labor market in disciplining management performance).
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This analysis necessarily is complicated by current disagreement
over the exact goals of bank regulation. For example, bank entry
into securities and other nonbanking activities could lead to the for-
mation of huge financial and industrial conglomerates.10 5 Fear of
concentration of financial power certainly has motivated some bank
regulation. 0 6 Yet as banks today face competition from giant diver-
sified foreign competitors, it is debatable whether keeping banks
small is a desirable regulatory goal.'0 7
Because of this danger of defining the regulatory interest too
broadly, this Article proposes a more narrow view of regulatory
goals. At a minimum, the goal of bank regulation is to safeguard the
banking system from systemic crises.10 8  Because achievement of
this goal requires maintenance of some form of federal "safety net,"
which today includes deposit insurance, t °° central bank lending to
banks experiencing liquidity problems," t0 and, most controversial,
government intervention to handle failed banks,"' protection of
this safety net is a second important goal of regulation. 1 2 If the
regulatory interest is defined in this way, then the hazards with
which bank regulation should be concerned are those that threaten
105. This has been the case in countries that do not restrict bank diversification. See
generally Daskin & Marquardt, The Separation of Banking from Commerce in the United Kingdom,
West Germany and Japan, 7 ISSUES BANK REG. 16 (1983).
106. The Bank Holding Company Act's restrictions on diversification were responsive
to this concern. See, e.g., Halpert, The Separation of Banking and Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J.
CORP. L. 481, 505-08 (1988).
107. See Rosenstein, supra note 8, at 1, col. 3 (Federal Reserve Board Chairman urges
Congress to allow banks to diversify to compete effectively with huge diversified foreign
banking organizations).
108. Systemic bank failure could have several undesirable effects. Massive bank fail-
ures could impair the operation of the payments system. They could deprive the credit
markets of liquidity, leading to failures of nonbanking businesses. They could eliminate
the investments of small savers. These dangers have led to general agreement that gov-
ernment must play some role in preventing system-wide bank failure. See generally Corri-
gan, supra note 32 (describing unique functions of banks).
109. Federal deposit insurance currently covers deposits in insured banks up to
$100,000 per depositor. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) (1988).
110. For a description of this function, and some examples of Federal Reserve lending
to defuse threatened liquidity crises, see W. MELTON, INSIDE THE FED: MAKING MONE-
TARY POLICY 153-70 (1985).
111. Regulatory practices such as providing direct financial assistance to troubled
banks and arranging mergers of failed banks with healthy banks are intended to avoid
the relatively greater cost to the insurance fund of liquidating failed banks and paying off
their insured depositors. For a description of current regulatory policy for handling
bank failures, see Bovenzi & Murton, Resolution Costs of Bank Failures, 1 FDIC BANKING
REV. 1 (Fall 1988).
112. Even critics of bank regulation tend to agree on the need for preservation of at
least some aspects of the safety net, particularly some form of deposit insurance. See
Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, supra note 79, at 313.
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the safety of the banking system or the continued viability of the
safety net.
1 3
As many potential hazards arguably pose this threat, a second
test is warranted to narrow the potential field. Assessment of the
hazards also should consider whether any potential harm can be
prevented through means other than special bank regulation, in-
cluding.competitive market forces, existing legal rules, or common-
law remedies such as private litigation. For example, a common ar-
gument against permitting banks to sell nonbank financial products
such as insurance is the possibility of customer abuses such as tying
banking and insurance products."' The effect of these abuses on
bank solvency is indirect: such abuses, if widespread, could under-
mine confidence in the banking system.
Even if this possibility is real, existing control mechanisms
should be sufficient to discourage customer abuses. Banks already
are subject to the antitrust laws, as well as special antitying rules
applicable to banking organizations.'1 5 Bank entry into the insur-
ance business is not likely to lead to abuses of such a different qual-
ity or magnitude that they cannot be handled by existing rules."16
Moreover, since the markets for both bank credit and insurance are
competitive, dissatisfied customers can find alternative suppliers
who do not insist on tying products." 7 Finally, deposit insurance
113. These two threats tend to be linked. Although the failure of a single large bank
leaves numerous healthy banks to handle credit needs, the failure could bankrupt the
insurance fund. This in turn could result in a loss of depositor confidence in other
banks and a system-wide banking crisis.
114. Tie-ins occur when the bank conditions obtaining one product, such as a loan,
on the customer's purchasing a second product from the bank, such as credit insurance.
See Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 249-51 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated inpart, 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 904 (1978). The seriousness and frequency of tying arrangements is subject to
question. See, e.g., Edwards, Economics of 'Tying' Arrangements: Some Proposed Guidelines for
Bank Holding-Company Regulation, 6 ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REV. 87, 88-89 (1973).
115. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1988).
116. From an administrative perspective, it may be easier to forbid banks fiom selling
insurance products than to monitor bank behavior to catch tie-ins. Lax enforcement of
the antitying rules may allow violations to occur that are not possible when banks are
forbidden to sell insurance. Nevertheless, administrative convenience does not justify
retaining barriers to bank diversification, particularly if increasing the competitiveness
of the banking and insurance markets itself may help to discourage anticompetitive prac-
tices like tie-ins. Moreover, similar abuses already can occur within banks that engage in
lending and other traditional bank activities, such as trust services. See Hunsicker, supra
note 80, at 650-54.
117. Most economists agree that, to maintain tie-ins, the seller must possess some
monopoly power over the tying product to foreclose competition in the tied product
market. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 114, at 89-92.
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helps to maintain public confidence in banks generally even if indi-
vidual bank customers become disillusioned with their own banks.
In sum, the significant hazards created by deregulation are
those that, first, pose a serious threat to the banking system and the
bank safety net, and second, cannot adequately be controlled by al-
ternative legal or market mechanisms. Such hazards are potentially
serious enough to warrant continued regulatory concern even if
their occurrence cannot be predicted with certainty. Section II iden-
tifies several such new "subtle hazards" and demonstrates why they
should be taken seriously when fashioning future bank regulatory
policy on diversification.
II. THE NEW SUBTLE HAZARDS
This Section refocuses the ongoing debate over subtle hazards
and the risks of deregulation by taking a fresh look at the conse-
quences of bank diversification. The real concerns raised by diversi-
fication are not specific abuses by individual bankers, but problems
of organization and management that arise when banks enter new
businesses. These new subtle hazards are far more serious, and less
easily solved, than the subtle hazards identified by Camp." 8
These new hazards are not necessarily unique to diversified
banks. Similar problems affect nonbank diversified conglomer-
ates." 9 Yet, for several reasons, these hazards pose a particularly
serious threat to banking. The nature of the banking business en-
courages diversification strategies that increase, rather than de-
crease, firm risk. Moreover, the presence of a bank within a
diversified conglomerate pressures management to make inefficient
funding decisions. Finally, combining banking with nonbanking ac-
tivities creates special problems of integration and control.
A. The Hazard of Inefficient Diversification
The most common argument for permitting greater bank diver-
118. These hazards are new only in the sense that, because of the influence of Camp,
they have not always been appreciated in the debate over deregulation. Although spe-
cific hazards, such as the hazard of inefficient funding, may seem similar to the problems
identified by Camp, this Article suggests a very different explanation for these practices.
See infra text accompanying notes 216-263.
119. The leading exposition of the benefits of the conglomerate form of organization
is 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
155-75 (1975). Recently, however, there has been a trend toward the breakup of large
diversified conglomerates as a result of market pressure, including "bust-up" takeovers.
For a description and explanation of this trend, see Coffee, supra note 103, at 15-60.
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sification is that diversification can reduce risk.1 20 Like a securities
investor, a bank may be able to reduce the variability of its earnings
by entering activities whose returns negatively correlate with the re-
turns on traditional banking businesses. Studies of diversification
have identified several such activities, including real estate and
insurance. 121
Arguments for diversification based on portfolio theory raise
two puzzling questions. First, it is curious that proponents of bank
diversification do not simply suggest that banks should be permitted
to take some of the money that they otherwise would invest in loans
or government securities and buy stock in real estate and insurance
companies.1 22 Instead, they assume that the risk-reducing effect of
investing in a diversified securities portfolio can be duplicated by a
bank that acquires and operates different businesses. But diversifi-
cation by a conglomerate is a very different and more costly process
than portfolio diversification by an individual securities investor.
Second, as a practical matter, it is unclear why banks are not
efficiently diversified already.12 Diversification does not require in-
vestment in a hundred different enterprises. Thejudicious selection
of ten different securities may suffice. 124 Banks already engage in a
variety of nonbanking activities, including numerous securities activ-
ities. 125 The returns of at least some of these activities must nega-
tively correlate with banking. Yet evidence suggests that banks have
diversified in an inefficient fashion, apparently choosing their new
activities for reasons that have little to do with efficient portfolios.
This past experience with diversification may be of use in evaluating
how and why banks are likely to diversify if they obtain additional
powers.
1. Can Banks Diversify as Efficiently as Portfolio Investors?-Devel-
opments in the securities markets have made diversification rela-
tively easy for the individual investor. If an investor wants to
diversify her securities portfolio to reduce risk, she can choose
120. See supra text accompanying note 45.
121. See Heggestad, supra note 90, at 222.
122. This Article ultimately proposes a version of this strategy by suggesting that
banks should diversify by making minority investments in nonbanking enterprises. See
infra text accompanying note 347.
123. Diversification is efficient if, for any given level of risk, expected return is as high
as possible and, for any given level of expected return, risk is as low as possible. See H.
MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS 19-26
(1959); see also W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 130, 178 (1970).
124. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 45, at 123.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 24-30.
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among hundreds of publicly traded stocks and bonds. The liquidity
afforded by the trading markets and the availability of public infor-
mation enable the investor to make portfolio decisions rapidly and
at little cost. If the investor has neither the expertise nor the incli-
nation to monitor the risk-return relationships of her investments,
she can put her money in a diversified mutual fund, where profes-
sionals will diversify for her.
Diversification by a banking organization or other business firm
is a very different process. Suppose that a bank decides that insur-
ance is a good portfolio mix with banking. In order to enter this
business, the bank must incur substantial start-up costs to train per-
sonnel, build a client base, and establish a reputation. Although the
bank can draw on its existing customers, these customers may not
necessarily prefer the bank to their own insurance company.
12 6
Moreover, the bank's customer base may not be large enough to
make the new business viable. So the bank will have to invest in
advertising, promotions, and other techniques to obtain a foothold
in the new business.' 27
Alternatively, the bank can enter the business by purchasing an
established insurance company. Such an acquisition may require
payment of a substantial premium to the firm's owners. At any time,
there may not be many desirable insurance firms for sale, so compe-
tition among buyers may be fierce.' 28 Moreover, in buying an estab-
lished company, the bank may be forced to acquire not just the
insurance business, but other businesses, such as consumer finance,
that do not fit the bank's ideal portfolio. 129 The bank then will have
to go through the process of divesting or terminating unwanted
operations. 130
126. Banks have discovered that the attractiveness to consumers of so-called "one-
stop shopping" for financial products may be outweighed by other considerations, such
as quality of service or perceived expertise. For example, banks still are experiencing
difficulty convincing their depositors to buy mutual funds from banks rather than from
securities firms. See Brenner, Buyers Unmoved by Bank Mutual Funds, Am. Banker, Oct. 13,
1988, at 2, col. 1.
127. One thing the bank cannot do is attempt to tie its new insurance products to
bank loans. See supra text accompanying notes 114-117.
128. For example, when banks began to enter the discount brokerage business in the
early 1980s, established brokers were able to demand high premiums to sell their
franchises to banks. In 1982, Chase reportedly paid seven times earnings to acquire
Rose & Co., at the time one of the leading discount brokerage firms. Horowitz, Chase
May Sell Discount Brokerage Subsidiary, Am. Banker, Nov. 8, 1988, at 3, col. 2.
129. See infra text accompanying note 182 (consumer finance returns positively corre-
late with those of banking).
130. See Johnson, The Rationale for Acquisition of Finance Companies by Bank Holding Corn-
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More generally, integrating a formerly independent company
into the bank's organizational structure often proves costly. Senior
management of the insurance company may leave, creating a void
that must be filled. Altering the acquired firm's salary structure and
benefits, accounting procedures, and management controls to fit the
bank's requirements may present additional problems. The bank
may have to reassure customers of the acquired firm that the change
in ownership will not affect existing services. 13
Once the bank enters a new business, subsequent portfolio ad-
justments may prove even more difficult than the initial effort to di-
versify. Proper portfolio management demands that the mix of
investments be re-evaluated should risk-return relationships among
investments change. For individual investors or a mutual fund, the
liquidity of the securities market allows adjustment of portfolio
holdings at very little cost. For a business, altering investments is
much more difficult. Diversified organizations have been very reluc-
tant to sell or spin off assets. In many cases, deconglomeration has
occurred only as a result of a takeover, or the threat of a takeover
that forced management to restructure. 132
This reluctance of conglomerate management voluntarily to
terminate operations may reflect a preference for asset growth. 13
Alternatively, at least in the case of banking organizations, selling or
terminating activities may impose special costs on the bank. Banks
have reason to fear any negative publicity that results from decisions
to reduce or terminate operations and employees.13 4 Such deci-
sions often are read by the market as a sign of financial difficulties at
the bank rather than efficient portfolio adjustment. This is particu-
larly true when a bank has made a substantial investment to enter a
panies, 92 BANKING L.J. 304, 310 (1975) (businesses, unlike individual securities inves-
tors, must make "lumpy" investments).
131. The cost of diversification is further increased by bank regulation. Banks may
have to obtain approval of one or more bank regulatory agencies to acquire new busi-
nesses. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988) (Federal Reserve approval required for
bank holding company acquisitions of nonbank companies). This cost will not be en-
tirely eliminated by deregulation of banking activities. For example, insurance regula-
tion still may require special regulatory approvals of changes in control of insurance
companies.
132. See Coffee, supra note 103, at 52-60.
133. For a discussion of this explanation of managerial motive, see id. at 28-31; see also
Jessup, Portfolio Strategies for Bank Holding Companies, 152 BANKERS MAG. 78, 81-82 (1969)
(arguing that preference of bank holding company managers for growth may explain
bank regulation designed to prevent acquisitions).
134. See, e.g., Duffy, Citicorp Cuts Trading Staff in UKby 85, Am. Banker, Jan. 13, 1988, at
2, col. 1 (Citicorp denies that serious trading losses suffered in October 1987 stock mar-
ket crash forced staff layoffs).
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new field. Recent cutbacks in fledgling bank securities operations
have been viewed as evidence that banks cannot make a success of
the securities business.135 This type of publicity could adversely af-
fect banks' quest for additional securities powers.
Other factors may account for the reluctance of banks to termi-
nate operations. If a particular business has become unprofitable
because of industry-wide conditions, the bank may want to termi-
nate the operation and enter another business. But the bank may
not be able to sell the business at a price that recoups the substantial
acquisition premium that it originally paid. 136  Further, the bank
may have integrated its new operations so successfully with its ex-
isting banking business that they now are almost impossible to sepa-
rate. ' 7  Thus, divestitures by banks are likely to be very
expensive. 138
In any case, efficient diversification may be impossible for many
banks. An efficiently diversified portfolio should not be over-
invested in any single security. If an investor puts ninety percent of
her money in one stock and only ten percent in another, she will not
obtain the optimal risk-reducing effect of diversification. Studies of
bank diversification have found the most efficient portfolios to be
those in which banking and nonbanking assets are equally
weighted. ' 39
135. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 128, at 3, col. 3 (Chase's recent decision to get out
of the discount brokerage business will "reinforce securities industry arguments that
banks don't have the stomach for the volatile retail brokerage business").
136. This may be the case in the discount brokerage business. In the early 1980s,
when banks sought and won permission to enter the field, discount brokerage was very
profitable. Banks had to pay large premiums to acquire established firms. Since the
October 1987 stock market crash, the discount brokerage business has suffered. In
1986, the industry's return on equity was 50%; in the first half of 1988, return on equity
was only 5.7%. See Horowitz, Manufacturers Hanover Slashes Brokerage Staff, Am. Banker,
Oct. 5, 1988, at 2, col. 1. As banks attempt to sell their brokerage businesses, it is very
unlikely that they will make a profit, or even recoup their investments. See Horowitz,
supra note 128, at 3, col. 4 (speculation that Chase will sell its brokerage subsidiary back
to its former owner at a discount price).
137. For explanation of why such integration is likely, see infra text accompanying
notes 251-260.
138. In some cases, regulation itself may force portfolio adjustment. For example,
Manufacturers Hanover Corporation made the decision to sell its profitable consumer
finance division to improve its capital position in response to regulatory capital require-
ments. Horowitz, Hanover Puts Consumer Unit Upfor Sale, Am. Banker, Mar. 4, 1988, at 1,
col. 4. Although this decision may have been an efficient portfolio adjustment, it did
cost the banking organization a valuable national distribution network. Id. at 14, col. 4.
139. See Johnson & Meinster, Bank Holding Companies: Diversification Opportunities in Non-
bank Activities, 1 E. EcoN. J. 316, 322 (1974) (equally weighted portfolios of banking and
12 other activities outperformed portfolios weighted according to industry asset size).
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Thus, a little bit of insurance, or securities underwriting, will
not have much of an effect on bank risk. Banks should diversify by
buying nonbanking assets roughly equal in size to their banking as-
sets. This could present difficulties, especially for large money
center banks. A bank such as Chase would have to buy Prudential,
or Merrill Lynch, before significant risk-reducing effects would be
realized. Yet such a combination would raise antitrust concerns as
well as more general public opposition.' 4 °
Bank diversification may be superior to individual diversifica-
tion in one respect. Because of its superior monitoring ability, a
conglomerate should be better than outside investors at assessing
the risk-return relationships of its own businesses.' 4 ' This should
benefit the conglomerate in two ways. First, subject to the limita-
tions already suggested, the conglomerate should be relatively effi-
cient in its choice of investments.' 42 Second, investors should be
attracted to diversified conglomerates as a way to achieve diversifi-
cation for themselves.
Nevertheless, recent literature suggests that, in general, con-
glomerates are not necessarily more successful at diversification
than individuals. 14 3 One reason may be that monitoring by individ-
ual investors has improved, due to the availability of more reliable
information about securities investments and the growing impor-
tance of sophisticated investors. "44 In addition, in the case of bank-
ing organizations, special management problems may interfere with
efficient monitoring. 45 In any event, the superiority of conglomer-
ate monitoring seemingly does not justify the substantial premiums
that banks must pay to diversify. This is confirmed by the lack of
140. See supra text accompanying notes 105-106 (historical concern over concentra-
tion of financial power). Legislative proposals to permit bank entry into securities activi-
ties have included specific provisions forbidding mergers between the largest banks and
securities firms. See Financial Modernization Act of 1988, S. 1886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.,
134 CONG. REC. S3360-62 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988) (forbidding affiliations between
banking organizations with assets of more than $30 billion and securities organizations
with assets of more than $15 billion).
141. See 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 119, at 132-54.
142. Professor Williamson concedes that the conglomerate is more limited than an
individual investor in its ability to diversify by acquiring and divesting assets. Id. at 148.
Nevertheless, because of its superior monitoring ability, the conglomerate firm can
"trade off breadth for depth." Id.
143. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 103, at 33 n.88 (citing evidence that diversification at
shareholder level has outperformed conglomerate firms); Johnson, supra note 130, at
309-10 (individual can "self-diversify" more efficiently than a bank holding company).
144. See Coffee, supra note 103, at 34.
145. See infra text accompanying notes 264-296.
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popularity of conglomerate stocks among investors generally.' 46
2. Are Banks Already Efficiently Diversified?-Another puzzling
question raised by portfolio theory is why banks are not already ex-
periencing the risk-reducing effects of diversification. Despite regu-
lation, banking organizations already can engage in a variety of
financial and even some nonfinancial activities. Banks or their affili-
ates can sell data processing services, 147 lease property,14 8 provide
courier services for financial documents, 149 operate a credit bu-
reau, 150 privately place corporate securities,"15 provide advice on
mergers and acquisitions, 152 arrange full service brokerage 15 and
interest rate swaps,' 54 and, on a limited basis, even underwrite cor-
porate debt, 155 equity, 156 commercial paper, 57 municipal bonds, ' 58
asset-backed securities, 159 and consumer-receivable-related securi-
146. See Coffee, supra note 103, at 52-60.
147. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(7) (1989) (nonbank affiliates). Performance of these activi-
ties by nonbank affiliates will not reduce risk in the bank itself. But if diversification
reduces risk in the banking organization as a whole, the parent holding company should
have greater capacity to provide financial support to its banking operations.
148. 12 U.S.C. § 24, seventh (1988) (national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(5) (1989)
(nonbank affiliates).
149. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(10) (1989).
150. Id. § 225.25(b)(24).
151. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
& FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, COMMERCIAL BANK PRIVATE PLACEMENT ACTIVITIES 12
(1978) (privately placing securities does not constitute underwriting or dealing in securi-
ties prohibited by Glass-Steagall).
152. See Bank of Nova Scotia, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 249, 249-51 (1988); Signet Banking Corp.,
73 Fed. Res. Bull. 59, 59-61 (1987).
153. See Bank of New England Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 700, 700-04 (1988) (allowing
bank affiliate to provide investment advice and brokerage in tandem to retail customers).
154. See Signet Banking Corp., supra note 152, at 59-61.
155. See Bank Underwriting Decision, supra note 27, at 195-96 (interpreting § 20 of the
Glass-Steagall Act, which forbids affiliations between banks and companies "engaged
principally" in underwriting and dealing in securities, to permit a limited amount of
underwriting of corporate debt securities by nonbank affiliates of banks). Outside the
United States, bank affiliates may underwrite unlimited quantities of corporate debt. 12
C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(13) (1989).
156. See Bank Underwriting Decision, supra note 27, at 195-96 (§ 20 of the Glass-Steagall
Act does not bar limited underwriting of equity securities by nonbank affiliates). Over-
seas, bank affiliates may underwrite and deal in equity securities subject to limitations of
two million dollars per issue per affiliate. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(13) (1989).
157. See Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra note 28, at 502.
158. 12 U.S.C. § 24, seventh (1988) (government obligations); see also Cit-
icorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra note 28, at 502 (industrial revenue bonds).
159. See Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra note 28, at 502.
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ties. 160 Some state-chartered banks may engage in real estate' 6 ' and
insurance activities.162
Presumably, at least some of these nonbanking activities should
be a good portfolio mix with banking. Studies have found that port-
folios of banking and real estate, data processing, or securities bro-
kerage are more efficient than portfolios of banking alone.' 63 This
suggests that banking organizations already should be able to
achieve the risk-reducing effects of diversification. Why have banks
apparently been so bad at efficient diversification?
One explanation may be that, until quite recently, a bank's
choice of permissible nonbanking investments was limited. Banks
have received permission to enter activities such as securities under-
writing and dealing only in the last few years. 16 4 Entry into these
activities has required banks to go through a lengthy regulatory ap-
plication process and often a judicial determination of the legality of
regulatory approvals. 165 Moreover, permission to engage in new ac-
tivities has been subject to regulatory restrictions, such as limits on
the total amount of permissible nonbanking business 166 and other
operating conditions. 67 These conditions, which are intended to
conform to existing legislative restrictions on bank securities activi-
160. See Chemical New York Corp., Chase Manhattan Corp., Bankers Trust New York Corp.,
Citicorp, Manufacturers Hanover Corp. and Security Pacific Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 731, 731-
35 (1987).
161. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 98 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1989).
162. See supra note 21.
163. See, e.g., Eisemann, supra note 90, at 73-75. Eisemann concluded that, given the
range of permissible nonbanking activities, bank regulation did not prevent banks from
diversifying efficiently. Id. at 77. But cf Stover, A Re-Examination of Bank Holding Company
Acquisitions, 13 J. BANK RES. 101, 106 (1982) (regulatory restrictions have constrained
bank holding company diversification). Both of these studies were conducted before the
recent regulatory interpretations of the Glass-Steagall Act that have permitted at least
limited bank entry into virtually every type of securities activity. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 151-160.
164. For the dates of such regulatory approvals, see supra notes 151-160.
165. See supra text accompanying note 31.
166. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
839 F.2d 44, 66-67 (2d Cir.) (upholding regulatory limitations on revenues from under-
writing ineligible securities to 5-10% of underwriting affiliate's gross revenues over a 2-
year period), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2830 (1988).
167. See, e.g., Bank Underwriting Decision, supra note 27, at 206-07 (forbidding exten-
sions of credit from bank to underwriting affiliates); see also infra text accompanying
notes 313-326.
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ties168 or to prevent conflicts of interest,"' may limit the ability of
the bank to achieve the full benefits of diversification.
But even prior to the adoption of regulation limiting bank di-
versification, banking organizations never were as diversified as such
classic conglomerates as ITT or Gulf & Western. Before passage of
the Bank Holding Company Act in 1956, very few bank holding
companies had substantial nonbanking operations. 70 At least one
bank holding company, Transamerica Corporation, had substantial
nonbanking interests, but these consisted almost exclusively of in-
surance operations.' 7 ' This experience suggests that banks are un-
likely to diversify generally into commercial businesses such as
aerospace or manufacturing, even if, for a portfolio investor, the
combination of such investments with banking reduces risk.
The reluctance of banking organizations to diversify broadly
may indicate that the banking business simply does not mix well
with general commercial activities. Most bank holding company
managers tend to be bankers rather than experienced conglomerate
managers.' 72 This may reflect, and perhaps perpetuate, the hands-
on management style of most bank holding companies with respect
to their subsidiary banks.' 7 The tendency for holding company
managers to be bankers is also encouraged by bank regulation.
Regulatory policy demands that managers exercise careful supervi-
sory authority over their banks. Bank holding company managers
may be held personally liable or even replaced for mismanagement
of subsidiary banks.' 7 4 Moreover, should a subsidiary bank fail,
bank holding company managers generally lose their jobs. 75 If
168. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d at 65
(gross revenue limitation on ineligible securities underwriting is designed to comply
with Giass-Steagall Act's requirement that banks not affiliate with companies "engaged
principally" in impermissible securities activities).
169. See infra text accompanying note 328.
170. See Halpert, supra note 106, at 497. Many bank holding companies originally
were formed by industrial companies that chose to enter banking not to diversify their
businesses, but to ensure a source of credit for themselves or their employees. See Ler-
ner, Three Financial Problems Facing Bank Holding Companies, 4J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
445, 445-46 (1972).
171. See Halpert, supra note 106, at 497.
172. This may be changing. One head of Citicorp's consumer banking division was a
former mass marketing executive at General Foods Corporation. See Bartlett,John Reed
Bumps into Reality, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
173. See infra text accompanying notes 272-276.
174. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b), (i), 1847(b)(1) (1988).
175. If the bank is the holding company's principal asset, failure of the bank usually
will result in the bankruptcy of the holding company. In addition, in arranging disposi-
tions of failed banks, the bank regulators recently have tried to ensure that holding com-
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bank holding company managers face personal responsibility for
problems at subsidiary banks, they have an incentive to monitor
banking operations closely. These managers may be less expert at
running nonfinancial companies or at operating a fully diversified
conglomerate.
Further, public perception of banks and bankers may contribute
to the reluctance to diversify too broadly. In banking, as well as
other financial businesses that service retail customers, reputation is
extraordinarily important. Most consumers view their banks differ-
ently from providers of other retail products, such as soap or
magazines. Consumers may be reluctant to buy banking products
from the same merchant or in the same store from which they
purchase lawnmowers or toothpaste. This reluctance may explain
the difficulties that companies like K mart have had selling banking
services in conjunction with consumer products.' 76 Consumers sim-
ply have trouble thinking of a major retailer like K mart as a banker
like Morgan or Citibank.' 77 Experience in countries in which major
financial and industrial concerns are linked indicates that this public
perception can be altered.178 Yet the strength of this perception can
lead to serious marketing difficulties when a bank is simply a single
part of a larger diversified conglomerate.' 79
pany managers are replaced. See, e.g., FDIC Agrees to Assistance Plan for Texas Bank Holding
Company Subsidiary Banks, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
87,067 (Sept. 9, 1987) [hereinafter First City Rescue] (open bank assistance to First
City's troubled subsidiary banks conditioned on removal of incumbent management).
176. A widely publicized program by First Nationwide Bank to sell banking services at
convenience branches in K mart stores recently was terminated, as the companies admit-
ted that there was no "natural affinity" between the retail store and the consumer-ori-
ented financial services company. See Robinson, Attention K mart Shoppers: Banking Hours
Are Over, Am. Banker, Feb. 13, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
177. Some diversified conglomerates that have decided to concentrate on financial
services have changed their names to erase their non-bank images. First Nationwide
Bank, K mart's partner in the venture described supra note 176, is now owned by Ford
Motor Company, but keeps its old name. See id.
178. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. If there also are government links
with the financial and industrial conglomerates, public perception of the safety and
soundness of the bank may be maintained regardless of its association with nonfinancial
interests.
179. The experience of commercial companies with the so-called "nonbank banks"
provides a telling example. Prior to 1987, many industrial companies took advantage of
a loophole in the Bank Holding Company Act to set up limited purpose banks that,
because they took deposits but did not make commercial loans, were not "banks" sub-
ject to the Act's restrictions on bank affiliation with commercial firms. See supra note 39.
Yet these deposit-taking entities never became major competitors in the market for de-
posits. Nonbanking companies, such as Household Finance, found it both difficult and
expensive to attract retail deposits to their new banks. See Gross, Financial Companies
Follow Spectrum of Strategies in Era of Deregulation, Am. Banker, May 26, 1987, at 32, col. 1.
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Thus, when banks diversify, they are more likely to enter other
financial businesses, such as finance, securities, or insurance, than
general commercial activities. 8 ' These financial conglomerates ob-
viously are very different from the classic diversified conglomerate
that combines businesses that service very different customers with
very different technologies. 18 ' Nevertheless, even within the finan-
cial services industry, some activities are a better fit with banking
than others. Studies have found that insurance activities are a better
portfolio mix with banking than mortgage banking or consumer
finance. ' 8 2
Nevertheless, although prior to 1982, bank holding companies
were permitted to engage in a number of insurance activities, 18 3
consumer finance was a far more popular activity for bank holding
companies looking to enter nonbanking businesses.'84 The banks'
rationale for acquiring a finance company was not to achieve an effi-
ciently diversified portfolio. Rather, banks saw finance as comple-
mentary to their existing businesses in terms of customer base,
marketing technique, and technology. Because banks already en-
gaged in mortgage lending, receivables lending, and other finance
company activities, acquisition of a finance company allowed banks
to offer a full package of complementary credit services to existing
bank and finance company customers. Thus, the ability to offer one-
stop shopping to financial customers was the principal motive for
finance company acquisitions.18
5
Gulf& Western (now Paramount Communications Inc.), which also bought a "nonbank
bank," eventually made the decision to concentrate on entertainment, and sold its finan-
cial services operations. Gulf & Western's decision may represent the general move to
deconglomeration that recently has been evident among industrial firms. It also may
suggest that financial services companies do not fit well into huge diversified industrial
or commercial conglomerates.
180. This also has been the diversification strategy of nonbank providers of financial
services, such as Prudential-Bache (insurance and securities) and American Express (in-
ternational banking, consumer financial services, investment banking, and insurance).
181. Financial services companies are more likely to make concentric acquisitions of
companies with common customers or technologies than true conglomerate acquisitions
of companies with different customers and technologies from their own. See Kitching,
Why Do Mergers Miscany?, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1967, at 84-85 (contrasting these
types of mergers).
182. See Eisemann, supra note 90, at 73.
183. See supra note 38.
184. This was particularly true in the 1970s, as bank holding companies first moved
into nonbanking activities in large numbers. See Eisemann, supra note 90, at 76; Talley,
supra note 96, at 42.
185. See Johnson, supra note 130, at 317-19. According to Johnson, banks may have
overestimated the potential for synergy in offering complementary financial services,
particularly as some of the products that banks proposed to offer through their new
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More recent bank diversification reflects a similar strategy. Ini-
tial bank forays into the securities business focused on private place-
ments, securities brokerage, and underwriting commercial paper,
municipal revenue bonds and asset-backed securities, each of which
activities permitted relatively easy bank entry. Customers for bank
private placement and commercial paper underwriting services tend
to be drawn from the bank's own customer base of corporate bor-
rowers.18 6 A convincing argument made by the banks in requesting
permission to place commercial paper was their need to service
these traditional bank customers. 8 7 Likewise, because banks al-
ready bought and sold securities for trust accounts and underwrote
certain government securities, 188 offering brokerage services to
other bank customers and underwriting other kinds of municipal
bonds were natural extensions of banks' existing activities.'8 9
This experience with bank diversification suggests that when
banks enter new activities, they are likely to choose their businesses
with an eye not to their covariance, but to their coordination with
traditional banking activities. This diversification strategy is ex-
plained by the nature of the financial services industry. Success in
financial services largely depends on achieving a reputation for ex-
pertise. Establishing that reputation in turn requires some experi-
ence in the financial markets. Companies seeking to issue securities
look for an underwriter with the ability to place their securities effi-
finance companies had been abandoned by independent finance companies as unprofita-
ble. Id. at 318-19. At least one study of bank holding company performance in con-
sumer finance and mortgage banking in the early 1970s found that the bank-affiliated
finance companies were less profitable than their independent competitors. See Talley,
supra note 96, at 44. This suggests that banks may have miscalculated the appeal to
customers of "one-stop shopping" for financial services. Nevertheless, banks would not
necessarily have been more successful in their early attempts at diversification had they
followed a strategy designed to combine businesses with negatively correlated returns.
See infra text accompanying notes 192-194.
186. Despite this natural customer base, bank entry into the private placement market
has been relatively slow. In 1984, commercial banks had a 12.3% share of the private
placement market; in 1987, their share had risen to 26%. See Neustadt, Banks Encroach on
Wall Street's Turf, Am. Banker, Apr. 4, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
187. See, e.g., Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra note 28, at 490 (bank holding com-
panies will be able to offer their borrowers an additional service and means of financing
that may be more economical).
188. These limited securities activities always were permissible under the Glass-Stea-
gall Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 24, seventh (1988).
189. See, e.g., National Westminster Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 584, 586-87 (1986),
aff'd sub nom. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 821
F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 697 (1988); see also Rehm, Banks Put New
Powers to Use, Am. Banker, Aug. 25, 1988, at 1, col. 2 (banks focus on municipal revenue
bonds).
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ciently and quickly. Such an underwriter must have in place some
form of securities distribution network, which can be established
through a presence in the secondary trading market.' 90 Likewise,
leadership in underwriting may be advertised as evidence of skill in
corporate finance and used to attract other business, such as advis-
ing on mergers and acquisitions. Thus, most financial services are
not separate businesses, but interdependent activities.191
The complementary nature of financial products can both help
and hinder banks in their efforts to enter new businesses. Some ac-
tivities, such as arranging interest rate swaps and securitizing assets,
are natural extensions of the bank's own business. Banks not only
can draw on their existing customer base, but already have expertise
in the underlying technology. 92 Banks may have more trouble en-
tering other new businesses. Inexperience in equity trading and un-
derwriting impeded most banks' efforts to enter the business of
advising on mergers and acquisitions, which often involves structur-
ing equity deals.' Likewise, banks have been unable to demon-
strate to retail customers why they are better sellers of mutual funds
than traditional brokers. 194
Further evidence that bank diversification aims for complemen-
tary expansion rather than risk reduction is the willingness of banks
to enter businesses that may not contribute to bank earnings. Re-
cently, discount brokerage and commercial paper underwriting have
been unprofitable both for securities firms' 95 and for the new bank
entrants. 196 That banks still are entering these activities suggests
190. See Hayes, Investment Banking: Commercial Banks Inroads, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
ATLANTA ECON. REV., May 1984, at 56, 57.
191. See id. at 56.
192. Banks can compete on an equal basis with securities firms in both fields. See
Weiner, Firms Favor Banks for Asset Sales, Am. Banker, Sept. 12, 1988, at 1, col. 2; Weiner,
Bankers Cite Edge over Rivals in Competitive Swaps Market, Am. Banker, Apr. 6, 1988, at 1,
col. 2.
193. See Horowitz, Banks Garner Few Domestic Merger Deals, Am. Banker, Apr. 7, 1988, at
1, col. 2 (in 1987, banks captured only 7.4% of the market as mergers and acquisitions
advisers). Banks' role in leveraged buyout lending helped some banks to break into this
business. The bank typically arranged the senior credit facility as well as served as ad-
viser to the buyout group. See Horowitz, Morgan Guaranty Surges on Deal List, Gets Lead
Role in Smith-Kline Merger, Am. Banker, Apr. 14, 1989, at 1, col. 2. Recent problems in
the leveraged debt markets have made this business less profitable for banks and their
nonbank competitors.
194. See Brenner, supra note 126, at 2, col. 1.
195. See Horowitz, There's Life After Glass-Steagallfor Wall Street, Report Says, Am. Banker,
Dec. 2, 1987, at 3, col. 2 (reporting Salomon's termination of its municipal bond and
commercial paper underwriting businesses).
196. See Horowitz, Bankers Trust Cuts Money Market Sales Force, Am. Banker, Nov. 1,
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that banks value these businesses more as a way to expand their cli-
ent base or to cross-sell financial products to existing customers
than for their inherent profitability.' 97 In addition, banks may be
using these activities to gain experience in the securities business
before moving on to more profitable activities, such as underwriting
corporate debt and equity. 198
The complementary nature of most financial products and the
need to establish a reputation for expertise to gain entry into the
financial services business suggest that a strategy of efficient diversi-
fication aimed solely at risk reduction may be counterproductive.
Choosing a new activity simply because its returns theoretically are
negatively correlated with banking returns does not reduce risk if
the bank has insufficient reputation, expertise, and contacts to es-
tablish a foothold in the new business. Moreover, although banks
eventually will gain sufficient experience to compete in virtually any
securities, insurance, or other financial business, they still may not
enter and exit businesses with an eye to their covariance with bank-
ing. Banks may prefer to protect their reputations-and to satisfy
customers-by continuing to offer some services even if they are no
longer profitable or a good portfolio mix with banking.
The complementary nature of most financial services itself casts
some doubt on the ability of banks to reduce risk by entering the
securities business or other financial businesses. One reason to al-
low banks to underwrite corporate securities is that, from the per-
spective of both the borrower and the bank, corporate lending and
underwriting are very much alike. From the borrower's point of
view, bank loans and issuances of debt securities are alternative
means of obtaining financing. 9 The borrower's choice generally
depends on the rates that it must pay on the loan or the securities.
Yet, today, these rates are determined largely by the same forces.
When interest rates rise, both the lending and securities markets are
affected. Corporations seeking to save on rates will consider such
1988, at 2, col. 2; Horowitz, Manufacturers Hanover Slashes Brokerage Staff, Am. Banker,
Oct. 5, 1988, at 2, col. 1.
197. Of course, as in the case of finance company acquisitions, banks may be overesti-
mating the synergy to be gained from combining these businesses with banking. See
supra note 185.
198. The Federal Reserve Board has concluded that banks' prior experience in private
placements and other securities activities should facilitate entry into corporate securities
underwriting. See Bank Underwriting Decision, supra note 27, at 198-99.
199. This is particularly true since the development of the commercial paper market,
which allows corporations to obtain short-term funding by selling debt securities with-
out registration under the Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1988).
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alternatives as borrowing in the foreign rather than in the domestic
markets, or going short- or long-term.200
Likewise, from the bank's point of view, making a loan and un-
derwriting securities do not create radically different risks. Both ac-
tivities require the bank to undertake a credit analysis of its
corporate customer to determine the bank's potential risk and to set
the rate at which the corporation can obtain funds. Moreover, the
bank can sell the loan almost as easily as it sells an issue of corporate
securities, either by offering pieces to other banks or "securitizing"
its entire portfolio.20 ' Today, an increasing percentage of many
banks' earnings is coming from fee income derived from trust serv-
ices, investment advice, private placements, and other services of-
fered by both banks and traditional securities firms.
Thus, even without radical deregulation, developments in the
financial markets are leading to more similarities than differences
among financial institutions. The demand for liquidity 20 2 encour-
ages uniformity in financial products, whether offered by banks, se-
curities firms, insurance companies, or other financial institutions.
If one financial institution "invents" a new financial product for a
corporate customer, it will soon be copied by other financial institu-
tions, which, although adding their own twists in response to regula-
tory demands or customer needs, will try to keep their product as
close to the original as possible.203 This cloning facilitates the prod-
uct's acceptance by the market and permits secondary trading in it
200. Historically, bank lending rates have readjusted more slowly than rates on short-
term debt securities that are keyed to money market yields. Thus, changes in the busi-
ness cycle have affected the choice between borrowing from a bank or borrowing from
the securities markets. Companies borrowed from banks in periods of rising interest
rates and from the debt markets in periods of falling rates. See Hurley, The Commercial
Paper Market, 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 525, 530-31 (1977). Recently, creative loan pricing,
such as basing interest rates on the commercial paper rate, has allowed loan and debt
interest rates to move in tandem. Today, the spread between these rates is more likely
to reflect the higher administrative expenses associated with bank lending and the credit
rating of the individual borrower than any systemic factors.
201. For a description of the process by which banks are packaging and selling inter-
ests in pools of their loans, see Roderer, Securitization of Bank Assets, 4 REV. FIN. SERVICES
REG. 29 (1988).
202. Liquidity in the financial markets means the ability to dispose of financial instru-
ments rapidly without causing a substantial decline in their price. See W. MELTON, Supra
note 110, at 154. This liquidity is facilitated when a new financial instrument is fungible
with instruments offered by other issuers.
203. As one banker stated, "One of the great traditions of Wall Street is plagiarism
and reciprocity." See Yacik, Asset-Backed Paper Gains Popularity, Am. Banker. Oct. 25, 1988,
at 22, col. 2 (quoting Richard Gerwitz, manager of Security Pacific's structured finance
department).
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and similar products.2 °4
If banks, securities firms, and insurance companies already offer
the same or similar products, it is unclear how these different busi-
nesses really are diverse. Giving banks full securities powers will
not grant them entry into an entirely new business, but will enable
them to add the few remaining pieces of the puzzle that are needed
to participate fully in today's financial markets. The most important
remaining difference between banking and other financial busi-
nesses may be regulation itself. For example, bank holding compa-
nies often choose to use nonbank affiliates to engage in activities
such as finance that already are permissible for banks. Their motive
is not to enter new businesses, but to avoid restrictive regulation
applicable to banks, such as limits on interstate banking, 0 5 interaf-
filiate funds transfers 20 6 and payment of dividends, 20 7 reserve re-
quirements,20 8 and deposit insurance premiums.20 9 In contrast,
nonbank financial firms want to set up banks to obtain the advan-
tages provided by bank regulation, such as the deposit insurance
guarantee against a liquidity crisis.
If regulation provides the real difference between a bank and a
nonbank financial firm, it is unclear why there will be any risk-reduc-
ing effect in combining banking and nonbanking financial activities.
In fact, such a combination may increase risk for the bank and its
204. An example of a financial market in which many different types of financial insti-
tutions are participating is the asset-backed securities market. The bundling of assets
into marketable securities, originally used to sell interests in pools of mortgages, was
adopted by banks as a way to package and sell their own loans in order to remove them
from their balance sheets, thus freeing up capital. See supra note 201. Banks and securi-
ties firms now offer the same service to corporate clients to enable them to securitize
their trade receivables, credit card receivables, and other assets. See, e.g., Miller, Conti-
nental to Launch Fund to Sell LBO-Backed Securities, Am. Banker, Nov. 2, 1988, at 2, col. 2.
As a result, the market for asset-backed securities has grown, enabling more financial
firms to enter the business.
205. Nonbank affiliates of bank holding companies are not subject to the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act's restrictions on interstate ownership of banks. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(d) (1988). Recent changes in state law are permitting full interstate banking. See
King, Tschinkel & Whitehead, Interstate Banking Developments in the 1980s, FED. RESERVE
BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., May-June 1989, at 32. Historically, an important justification
for acquiring nonbank affiliates was to establish an interstate network of offices that
would be in place when interstate banking became a reality. SeeJohnson, supra note 130,
at 330-31.
206. Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act limits loans and other extensions of
credit by banks to their nonbank affiliates. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988).
207. See, e.g., id. § 60(b) (national banks need regulatory approval to pay dividends in
excess of net profits plus retained earnings for two preceding years).
208. See 12 C.F.R. § 204.3 (1989) (banks must maintain reserves against their deposits
and Eurocurrency liabilities).
209. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (1988).
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investors. As ,deregulation proceeds, any remaining regulatory dis-
tinctions between banking and nonbanking financial activities will
vanish. In particular, the special regulatory protections currently af-
forded banks, as opposed to nonbanks, will be impossible to
maintain. 1
If the quid pro quo for allowing banks to diversify is some cut-
back in the special subsidies that banks now receive, then diversifica-
tion will impose significant costs on banking organizations. In this
respect, it is revealing to note the reaction of the market for bank
stocks to greater bank diversification. Today, most publicly owned
banking organizations are organized as bank holding companies
which already are somewhat diversified. Thus, when they buy bank
holding company stock, investors are buying an interest not only in
one or more banks, but also in various nonbank affiliates. Yet, over
the past few years, the market has tended to discount bank holding
company stocks, particularly those of the largest and most diversi-
fied banks.2 1 1 Perhaps market participants believe that, whether be-
cause of bad management or regulatory constraints, bank holding
companies have not diversified as effectively as they might.212 Alter-
natively, investors in banking organizations may not place a great
value on conglomerate diversification, preferring to diversify for
themselves. 2
1 3
Nevertheless, evidence suggests that the market may value the
bank charter and the regulatory protection that charter provides.
Although some banking organizations could conduct most or all of
their current operations without a bank charter and thereby avoid
costly regulation, banks are very reluctant to relinquish their char-
ters for fear of a severe negative market reaction z.21  This suggests
that, in the view of investors in bank stocks, the potential benefits of
diversification may not outweigh the potential costs of losing the
210. The regulators already are responding to greater diversification by banking orga-
nizations by distinguishing more carefully between debtholders of the bank and of the
bank holding company in working out entitlements to regulatory assistance to troubled
banks. Moreover, the cost of handling the failure of huge diversified banking organiza-
tions is forcing some reappraisal of deposit insurance coverage. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 299-311.
211. See, e.g., Matthews, Money Center Stocks Weaken, Analysts Find, Am. Banker, Dec. 15,
1987, at 25, col. 1.
212. Shareholders also may be reacting to these banks' large international exposures.
These loan concentrations also are a sign of insufficient diversification.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 143-146 (investors' preference for self-diversi-
fication over investing in conglomerates).
214. See, e.g., Horowitz, Chase Backs Off Threat to Drop Bank Charter, Am. Banker, June 2,
1988, at 1, col. 2.
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special subsidies that regulated banks now enjoy.215
B. The Hazard of Inefficient Funding
If the risk-reducing effect of diversification is the chief weapon
of defenders of deregulation, the danger of inefficient funds trans-
fers is the main string in the bow of its opponents. The risk that
banks will use their resources to support their nonbanking opera-
tions is one of the subtle hazards identified in Investment Company
Institute v. Camp.2 16 Why such cross-funding is so dangerous is not
explained in Camp. Camp does suggest that loans to a nonbank affili-
ate may be unsound, creating a risk of default and losses for the
bank. 21 7 But regulatory concern over cross-funding reflects more
than the possibility that a bank may pour money into its failing non-
bank affiliate. Bank regulation has sought to limit any extension of
credit or other financial transactions between banks and their non-
bank affiliates.2 1l
Is the danger of cross-funding still a significant hazard of bank
diversification? Critics of regulation argue that a bank has no incen-
tive to subsidize financially troubled operations in ways that
threaten the solvency of the bank itself.2 1 9 Moreover, existing regu-
lation of interaffiliate transactions should suffice to prevent ineffi-
cient transfers that may occur as a result of fraud or mismanagement
on the part of individual bankers. Nevertheless, these arguments
are belied by numerous instances in which, despite regulation,
banks have diverted funds to troubled nonbank affiliates. Banks
have purchased bad loans from nonbank affiliates, although such
transactions violated bank regulation and led to the bank's fail-
ure.22" Banks have mad loans to bail out failing nonbank opera-
tions, occasionally even with the encouragement of the regulators,
as in the case of the real estate investment trusts in the 1970s.2 2
Most recently, Continental ignored lending limits to rescue its op-
215. This conclusion has not been tested empirically, primarily because no major
banks have chosen to give up their bank charters in order to diversify.
216. 401 U.S. 617, 631-32 (1971); see supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
217. 401 U.S. at 631.
218. Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act generally limits financial transactions
between a bank and each nonbank affiliate to 10% of the bank's capital and surplus and
between a bank and all of its nonbank affiliates to 20% of the bank's capital and surplus.
12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988). These limits do not distinguish between loans to failing and to
healthy affiliates.
219. See Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, supra note 79, at 326-27.
220. See J. SINKEY, PROBLEM AND FAILED INSTITUTIONS IN THE COMMERCIAL BANKING
INDUSTRY 202 (1979) (Hamilton National Bank).
221. See id. at 237-55.
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tions trading subsidiary following the October 1987 stock market
crash.222
This suggests the need for a closer look at interaffiliate transac-
tions and other funding questions that arise in a diversified banking
institution.2 23 Two points may be made about this particular hazard
of diversification. First, not all funds transfers from bank to non-
bank operations are likely to cause the failure of the bank. Never-
theless, such transfers may defeat the goal of efficient portfolio
diversification. Second, in diversified banks, there are incentives for
banks to make inefficient funds transfers from banking to nonbank-
ing operations that may result in losses or even failure of the diversi-
fied organization.
1. Diversification and Cross-Subsidization.-In a diversified con-
glomerate, cross-funding among affiliates or operations is not nec-
essarily bad. A frequently cited advantage of the conglomerate form
of organization is the conglomerate's ability to engage in efficient
funds allocation among its various enterprises. 224 Because of their
superior ability to monitor the performance of their own businesses,
conglomerate managers theoretically can allocate cash flows to the
highest yielding operations more efficiently than a private investor
seeking to divide her money among alternative investment
securities.225
In addition, conglomerate managers may allocate funds in ways
that private investors would be unlikely to choose, such as taking
funds from healthy operations to offset temporary losses in another
business.22 6 Management's superior knowledge of its operations
may permit it to take a longer view of overall funds allocation deci-
sions than the average investor. For example, in a diversified bank,
if banking operations are profiting while securities operations are
222. Continental's loan was intended to keep its subsidiary in compliance with its own
regulatory and exchange capital requirements following losses suffered as a result of the
stock market crash. See Ringer, First Options' Luster Was Tarnished in Hard Week at Futures
Exchange, Am. Banker, Oct. 28, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
223. Although regulatory limits on cross-funding are directed to transactions between
banks and their nonbank affiliates or subsidiaries, funding issues also arise when non-
banking activities are located within the bank itself. Because resource allocation within a
single company is almost impossible to police, bank regulation has required the location
of nonbank activities in separately incorporated affiliates. See infra text accompanying
notes 314-316.
224. For the most cogent exposition of this thesis, see 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 119,
at 147-48.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 164-65.
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experiencing cash flow difficulties, management may decide to use
bank profits to shore up securities operations. The securities divi-
sion may be on the verge of launching a "new" security that will
garner new business, but the division needs funds now to pay its
lawyers.
In the short run, however, this funding strategy may interfere
with the risk-reducing aim of diversification. If the banking organi-
zation has diversified into nonbanking activities whose returns are
negatively correlated with those of banking, then presumably the
nonbanking business will fare badly, and require additional funding,
under economic conditions in which the traditional banking busi-
ness is prospering.22 7 When conditions are favorable for a particu-
lar business, even management mistakes are easy to hide or correct.
When industry conditions are poor, the same mistakes may lead to a
financial crisis. Thus, in an efficiently diversified banking organiza-
tion, nonbank operations are likely to require financial assistance
from the bank at times when business conditions are good for bank-
ing but not good for the nonbanking business.
When business conditions are good for banking, however, the
diversified bank could use its profits to invest in additional high re-
turn banking ventures or even to increase dividends. If, instead,
bank profits are diverted to support troubled nonbanking opera-
tions, the diversified bank may be at a competitive disadvantage with
respect to undiversified banks. Shareholders looking for short-term
profits may disfavor the diversified bank. Yet, if the bank does not
support its nonbanking operations, then a significant advantage of
conglomeration, and a justification for the high premium that the
bank paid to acquire its nonbanking operations, are lost. 2 8
Thus, the short-term aim of risk reduction through diversifica-
tion and the long-term advantages of conglomeration may be some-
what at odds. As individual portfolio investors are likely to take a
short-term view of risk and return, they may have reason to avoid
conglomerates that take the longer view at the expense of immedi-
ate earnings. This may be another reason why securities investors
prefer to undertake their own diversification rather than to buy con-
glomerate stock.22 9
227. See supra text accompanying note 45.
228. SeeJohnson, supra note 130, at 312.
229. See supra text accompanying note 146. The affiliate's debtholders may welcome
the additional guarantee provided by cross-funding. Holding company debtholders
should react negatively to any diversion of resources to benefit creditors of a subsidiary
at their expense. See infra note 296.
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In the case of diversified banking organizations, however, the
incentives to engage in cross-funding may outweigh concerns over
the equity market's reaction. In a diversified bank holding company,
the bank generally is able to raise funds at lower rates than either its
nonbank affiliates or its holding company. This may be true even
during periods of low profitability for the banking business. Banks
always have access to core deposits that pay below-market rates of
interest and are not overly sensitive to changes in financial condition
at individual banks.23 0 In addition, the protection afforded deposits
by deposit insurance gives banks a natural funding advantage.
In contrast, to the extent that the nonbank affiliate ever raised
funds directly from the capital markets, its access to these markets is
affected by changes in its financial condition. At the very time that
the affiliate is in need of funding, its ability to raise capital may be
impaired.23  The holding company's cost of funds also may be neg-
atively affected by problems at its affiliate. But the bank's access to
the deposit market may not be affected at all. 2  In any case, the
bank can weather a temporary liquidity crisis by borrowing from the
230. These deposits include noninterest or low interest-bearing transaction accounts,
escrow accounts and payroll accounts, which may be costly or inconvenient to move to
another bank. See supra note 78. There may be occasions when the bank's cost of funds
exceeds that of its holding company. This may occur if the bank is relying excessively on
wholesale deposits such as jumbo certificates of deposit rather than core deposits and
the bank is experiencing financial difficulties, causing wholesale depositors to demand a
premium to invest. For example, First Nationwide, a thrift owned by Ford Motor Com-
pany, replaced three billion dollars of its high yielding wholesale deposits with advances
from its parent company, which could issue commercial paper at lower rates than the
thrift could borrow. Robinson, First Nationwide Reduced Deposits by 1776 in Month, Am.
Banker, Feb. 27, 1989, at 1, col. 3. Nevertheless, in most cases, such a difference in
funding costs is likely to be short-lived. The inability of a bank to obtain cheap deposits
generally is a sign of weakness at the bank (although, in First Nationwide's case, it may
have reflected more general problems in the savings and loan industry). Problems at the
bank generally begin to affect the holding company's funding costs relatively quickly. In
the case of First Nationwide, the size and strength of its parent proved an exception. In
most cases, the identity and credit standing of the bank holding company is tied closely
to the fortunes of its bank affiliate.
231. Likewise, it may find it costly or impossible to borrow from an unaffiliated bank.
232. The existence of deposit insurance may reassure depositors that the failure of an
affiliate will not affect their investments in the bank. Regulation requiring banking orga-
nizations to place their nonbanking activities in separate affiliates from the bank is in-
tended to reinforce the notion that the bank will not be affected by failure of a nonbank
affiliate. Occasionally, however, depositors may disagree. When Beverly Hills Bancor-
poration defaulted on its commercial paper, a deposit run began at its subsidiary bank,
Beverly Hills National Bank, by depositors who could not distinguish the bank from its
holding company. Mayne, New Directions in Bank Holding Company Supervision, 95 BANKING
L.J. 729, 731 (1978). To avoid any confusion, bank regulators occasionally have re-
quired nonbank affiliates to have a different name from their affiliated bank. See, e.g.,
National Westminster Bank PLC, supra note 189, at 588.
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central bank. Bank holding company management has a strong in-
centive to use funds from the bank to support nonbank
operations.233
Thus, bank funding of nonbanking operations has particular
advantages in a diversified banking organization.234 Such funding
may not result in short-term profits, but may be in the long-term
interest of the entire organization. This assumes that management's
funding decisions are efficient and will not jeopardize banking oper-
ations. Yet, as will be shown, there may be strong incentives for
management to make inefficient funds transfers as well.
2. Management's Incentives to Make Inefficient Transfers.-Why
would any management make interaffiliate funds transfers that jeop-
ardize healthy operations? Competent and honest managers pre-
sumably have no reason to make transfers that could threaten their
entire organization. This argument, however, assumes that manag-
ers of diversified organizations always make correct assessments of
appropriate funding needs and uses.
No management is infallible. Occasionally, most if not all man-
agers make the wrong funding choices. Managers of diversified or-
ganizations may feel particular pressure when one or more of their
operations is about to fail. The pressure to avoid failure at any cost,
even by risking healthy operations to bail out unhealthy ones, may
cause managers to make inefficient funding decisions. This pressure
is especially strong in banking and other financial services indus-
tries. Moreover, as this pressure is created by diversification itself,
existing market and legal controls may not be sufficient to offer ade-
quate counterincentives.
a. Management's Incentive to Resist Failure.-Most managers of
diversified banking organizations will not deliberately choose to
cause their bank to fail by diverting bank funds to shore up failing
nonbank operations. Nevertheless, most managers will not antici-
pate the failure of part or all of their business. In order to reach the
decision not to support an ailing nonbank operation, managers
must admit that the business is beyond saving and that their own
mismanagement or lack of skill led to its demise. These conclusions
233. This discussion assumes a holding company structure. When banking and non-
banking activities are combined in a single entity, management may also prefer to use
cheap deposits, rather than the more expensive funds that are raised by selling new
equity or debt, to fund nonbanking operations.
234. In contrast, management has less incentive to draw upon nonbank operations to
fund troubled banking operations. Cf infra text accompanying notes 290-296.
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are very hard for most managers to accept. It is easier to believe
that the problems are temporary and can be solved by a little fund-
ing from the bank.
This resistance to the inevitability of failure may continue even
as new funds are squandered and the bank begins to feel the strain.
Scholars have noted the importance of "groupthink" in explaining
seemingly irrational and inefficient management behavior.23 5 The
tendency of a management group to suppress information that is
contrary to its interests or expectations may lead it to underestimate
the severity of a problem. 236 The temptation to minimize problems
may be especially strong for banking organizations as they enter
new nonbanking businesses. Failure in any of these new activities
may lead to public pressure to stop further deregulation on the the-
ory that if banks cannot handle even limited new powers, they
certainly should not be given further opportunities for
diversification.237
Therefore, management may underestimate both the extent of
the financial problems in nonbank operations and the effect of di-
verting funds from the bank. Management may even feel justified in
flouting legal barriers to interaffiliate lending if it believes that the
situation is temporary and that the bank will be reimbursed. More-
over, management's misjudgment is unlikely to be disciplined by
market forces. Given the ease and rapidity of funds transfers within
a corporation, many investors, particularly depositors, will not be
aware of the inefficient allocation of resources until it is too late.23 8
If more sophisticated investors, such as bank holding company
shareholders and debtholders, do learn of the funds transfers, these
investors can react by refusing to supply additional funds to the
bank holding company. This, however, actually may increase man-
235. See, e.g., Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 14-17
(1986) (explaining tendency of corporate management to underestimate severity of
mass tort threat).
236. Id. at 15.
237. For example, recent losses and staff cutbacks in the fledgling securities opera-
tions of major banks may be read by competitors and the public as an admission of
failure in the securities business. See supra text accompanying note 135. The problems
that banks experienced in their London securities operations in 1986 and 1987 also have
been cited by opponents of deregulation as a reason to restrict domestic securities un-
derwriting by banks. The Federal Reserve, however, rejected this argument as a reason
to deny new underwriting powers to banks. Bank Underwriting Decision, supra note 27, at
212.
238. Many depositors simply do not monitor a bank's condition on an ongoing basis,
and will not react to any problem until and unless a crisis occurs, such as the bank's
imminent collapse. See supra note 78.
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agement's incentive to rely on bank deposits, particularly core de-
posits, which remain available to the bank. Thus, any market
reaction may exacerbate the problem, hastening the bank's
failure.23 9
b. Management's Incentive to Protect Its Reputation.-From the
perspective of a diversified portfolio investor, losses from the failure
of any one investment may be offset adequately by profits from suc-
cessful investments. Management cannot afford to take the same
view. Even in a diversified organization, the failure of any single
operation is likely to have a significant effect on management's repu-
tation. Shareholders in the diversified organization may doubt the
ability of management to operate the remaining businesses. 240 The
organization as a whole may experience difficulty in obtaining new
financing either from the securities markets or from bank lenders,
who may distrust management's ability. These risks may lead man-
agement to make inefficient funding decisions, such as diverting
funds from healthy enterprises, to avoid failure at all costs.
The reputational effects of business failure are particularly
acute in the case of banking organizations. The banking business
depends heavily on reputation to attract and retain customers. The
ideal banker's reputation traditionally was one of conservatism and
probity. If a banker was known to have failed in one financial enter-
prise, a good reputation would be very difficult to maintain. In fact,
a banker's reputation might be tarnished if the banker became in-
volved in any speculative or risky operation. This notion is reflected
in Investment Co. Institute v. CaMp,241 in which the Supreme Court ex-
pressed the fear that aggressive securities practices could damage
239. Some critics argue that neither bank managers nor capital suppliers worry about
bank failure, since the cost of failure is imposed on the government. See Macey & Miller,
Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153,
1162-65 (1988). Recently, the bank regulators have attempted to ensure that managers
and shareholders of failed banks and their holding companies lose their investments. See
infra text accompanying notes 308-311. For example, the regulators may take over and
sell a failing bank's healthy assets to another institution, using the proceeds to reimburse
bank creditors and government expenses. Id. Increasing the burden of bank failure on
managers and shareholders actually may strengthen incentives to use bank assets to sup-
port nonbank operations. Id. If the bank's resources are transferred to its nonbank
affiliates, then, even if the bank fails, these assets will be available for bank holding com-
pany investors and managers. Id.
240. Moreover, the taint of failure may affect a manager's ability to find a new job.
See, e.g., Roe, supra note 235, at 11 (describing effect of failure on managers of liquidated
mass tort firms).
241. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
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the reputation of the banker for prudence and restraint.242
Changes in the financial markets have altered the banker's im-
age. Nevertheless, in some ways, these changes have made reputa-
tion an even more significant factor in the success or failure of a
bank. Today, success in the financial services industry depends on
the ability to demonstrate experience and expertise in a wide variety
of related financial markets.2"' The modern banker needs a reputa-
tion for financial acumen as well as a proven track record as a suc-
cessful manager of risk. If a banker has presided over the failure of
an operation, such as securities underwriting, it is unlikely that cus-
tomers will choose to rely on that banker for other financial services,
such as advice on financing or mergers. Moreover, the bank regula-
tors may distrust management's ability to run its banking operations
in a risk-averse manner. The regulators may require certain under-
takings from the banking organization with respect to future opera-
tions, and may even require divestiture of remaining nonbanking
operations2 44 or the resignations of incumbent management.2
45
Failure of a nonbank operation may have more general effects
on public confidence in the bank itself. Although, as a legal matter,
liabilities of a nonbank affiliate are not the responsibility of investors
in the bank, many depositors are unable or unwilling to make this
distinction. This tendency to identify the bank with its affiliates is
not irrational. Until recently, most bank holding companies were
simply shells set up to hold bank stock, with few if any other assets.
Thus, holding company problems were bank problems, and vice
versa. Even now, the similarity in names between holding compa-
nies and their lead banks promotes confusion, particularly among
less sophisticated depositors. 246 Foreign depositors also may begun-
familiar with the holding company structure, and assume that a bank
and its affiliates are a single entity. Finally, regulatory policies with
respect to bank failure continue to blur the distinction between the
bank and its affiliated companies.247
242. Id. at 632.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 190-199.
244. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(e)(1) (1988) (authorizing Federal Reserve Board to force
divestiture of nonbank affiliates if their continued operation poses a risk to an affiliated
bank).
245. See id. § 1818(e)(3).
246. See supra note 232.
247. For example, the regulators occasionally have tried to force a bank holding com-
pany to contribute nonbank assets to support a failing subsidiary bank. See infra text
accompanying notes 309-310. This policy understandably exacerbates confusion over
the separate identities of bank and nonbank affiliates.
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Whether or not public perception has any basis in fact, if man-
agement fears that depositors or other investors or customers iden-
tify nonbank affiliates with the bank, it has a strong incentive to
prevent the failure of an affiliate. This attitude has been expressed
by bankers themselves in describing their management policy with
respect to nonbank affiliates.24 In addition, the fear that banks are
so closely identified with their nonbank operations that the bank will
be penalized if its nonbanking business fails occasionally has led
even the regulators to encourage banks to bail out nonbank opera-
tions.249 This suggests that management will rationalize the use of
bank funds to assist troubled nonbanking operations as necessary to
prevent the potentially negative impact of failure on the bank
itself.250
c. Management's Incentive to Preserve Business Links.-Even if all
legal barriers to bank diversification are removed, banks are unlikely
to acquire and hold a portfolio of separate and autonomous busi-
nesses. All prior bank diversification has involved entry into com-
plementary businesses that can be operated in conjunction with
existing banking operations. 25' Expansion into complementary
businesses permits the bank to take advantage of certain economies
of scale, particularly the sharing of expensive computer and data
processing services and joint marketing and exchange of customer
lists.
As banks diversify into complementary product areas, they tend
to integrate their new businesses with their traditional banking op-
erations. Initially, banks may keep their new businesses in separate
divisions or affiliates.252 Nevertheless, because the bank's new serv-
ices are marketed to the same customers that already deal with the
bank's lending and trust officers, eventually the bank will prefer to
248. Even Walter Wriston, former chairman of Citicorp, admitted that it was "incon-
ceivable" that any major bank would walk away from any subsidiary of its holding com-
pany. " 'If your name is on the door, all of your capital funds are going to be behind it
in the real world,' Mr. Wriston added. "'Lawyers can say you have separation, but the
marketplace is persuasive and would not see it that way.' " Garsson, Building a 'Firewall':
Can It Work?, Am. Banker, Dec. 14, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
249. See, e.g., J. SINKEY, supra note 220, at 237-55.
250. If nonbanking operations are located in the bank itself, the need to avoid failure,
and the incentive to use depositors' funds to bail out troubled nonbank operations, is
even stronger. See supra note 233.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 183-209.
252. This often is required by law or regulation. See, e.g., Bank Underwriting Decision,
supra note 27, at 195 (underwriting of corporate securities only through separate non-
bank affiliates).
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reorganize its business to facilitate joint marketing. This integration
permits the bank to avoid duplication and to maintain more central-
ized control of credit appraisal and documentation. Several large
banking organizations have reorganized their operations to combine
investment and commercial banking functions in divisions or groups
oriented toward particular industries or geographic markets.25 3
Others have streamlined their operations by providing centralized
services, such as data processing, to all of their subsidiary banks and
nonbanks.2 54
This restructuring inevitably increases operational dependen-
cies between traditional banking and the new nonbanking opera-
tions. Financial difficulties in one operation not only hurt the
earnings of the organization as a whole, but deprive other parts of
the entity of essential services. For example, a bank's securities bro-
kerage operation not only may service bank customers, but also may
provide execution for the bank's trust department and sell securities
underwritten by the bank or another affiliate.255 If the brokerage
operation fails, the bank's other businesses may suffer. Thus, the
interdependence of operations justifies using bank resources to sup-
port a troubled broker or other affiliate.
In addition, the substantial investment in time, human capital,
and reputation required to make a success of financial businesses
may justify a management strategy that preserves each independent
part of the operation. Entry into such activities as securities under-
writing or dealing demands some showing of experience and exper-
tise before a bank can gain a sufficiently strong reputation in the
market to attract business. Banks have sought to build this reputa-
tion in a variety of ways, including paying substantial premiums to
buy established and successful businesses, 2 56 wooing experts from
nonbank rivals to head new operations, 257 and servicing less profita-
ble sectors of the securities market to obtain experience in new
253. See, e.g., Horowitz, Morgan Revamps Corporate Lending Group, Am. Banker, Sept. 26,
1988, at 3, col. 2 (reorganization into industry group teams); Fraust, Chemical Restructures
to Merge Investment Banking, Lending, Am. Banker, Feb. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (one-stop
shopping for corporate clients).
254. See Luke, 1st Interstate Begins Round of Staff Layoffs, Am. Banker, July 5, 1988, at 2,
col. 1 (consolidation of back office operations).
255. See, e.g., Bankers Trust New York Co., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 695, 699 (1988) (authoriz-
ing bank brokerage affiliate to recommend or sell securities it underwrites or deals in to
institutional customers).
256. See, e.g., supra note 128.
257. See, e.g., Neustadt, Rosenfeld to Run Merchant Bank at Bankers Trust, Am. Banker,
Nov. 10, 1988, at 2, col. 2 (former Salomon chief financial officer hired by bank to run
new corporate finance division).
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areas.
2 58
Once these substantial start-up investments are made, it is very
difficult for management to abandon the business if it begins to ex-
perience losses. Moreover, the need to maintain a loyal client base
may demand that certain services be provided even when spreads
are thin. A bank cannot succeed in the securities business by under-
writing issues of securities only when spreads.are wide. Successful
underwriters must maintain ongoing relationships with both issuers
and securities purchasers.
The need to build and maintain a reputation suggests that a
successful financial services company must support its operations in
lean times. This always has been true in the traditional banking
business. Banks are reluctant to refuse to lend to good customers
when spreads are thin for fear of losing customer good will that is of
value in good times. This need to sustain financial operations was
demonstrated by the actions of banks in the 1920s with respect to
their securities affiliates. In order to break into the securities busi-
ness, the banks relied upon their superior ability to distribute secur-
ities through their retail branch networks and contacts with
correspondent banks. Once banks hired securities salesmen for
those offices and provided correspondents with securities, they felt
pressure to supply a continuous flow of new securities for their em-
ployees to sell and their customers to buy.259
Although to conclude that bankers' need to justify their invest-
ments in securities operations was the sole cause of the securities
speculation of the 1920s 26 0 may overstate the role of the bank secur-
ities affiliates, this example does illustrate the pressures inherent in
the financial services industry. A banking organization cannot af-
ford to let the failure of one of its businesses disrupt other services
to clients. Therefore, bank management has strong justification to
use bank funds to support related financial operations.
d. Management's Incentives and Regulatory Policy.-Ironically,
bank regulatory policy unintentionally may provide a motive for
management to use bank funds to support an ailing nonbank affili-
ate. Largely because of regulation, bank deposits are more readily
258. See supra text accompanying notes 195-198.
259. 75 CONG. REC. 9911 (1932) (statement of Sen. Bulkley). Senator Bulkley argued
that the fixed expenses of the national securities distribution networks set up by banks
required the banks to find a sufficient supply of new issues to keep the securities sales-
men busy, in some cases even by encouraging underwriting clients to issue new securi-
ties when they had no need of financing. Id.
260. See id.
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available, and less expensive, than other sources of funding for a
diversified banking organization. 26' The protection afforded by de-
posit insurance, the bank's access to the discount window, and regu-
latory monitoring of bank condition all make investments in a bank
safer than investments in a nonbank affiliate.
The ready availability of deposits is likely to affect manage-
ment's preferences with respect to the use of assets in diversified
banking organizationi. Should an ailing nonbank operation require
funding, management will prefer to use bank funds to assist it,
rather than relying on more expensive holding company or nonbank
affiliate funds. Moreover, even if this cross-funding jeopardizes the
healthy source of funds, the consequences may appear to be less
severe when a bank rather than a nonbank affiliate is the source of
funding. Management may count on the protection afforded by de-
posit insurance and the discount window to reassure depositors who
fear the effect of any resulting financial drain on the bank's liquidity.
In addition, management may count on the bank's regulators to
monitor the bank's condition and to sound a warning and take pre-
ventive measures before the financial drain leads to failure.2 6 2 This
suggests that management may have reason to gamble on the bank's
ability to survive the strain of inefficient interaffiliate transfers, par-
ticularly if, in management's view, the problem at the nonbank affili-
ate is temporary.
263
261. See supra text accompanying note 230.
262. Reliance on the regulators to anticipate problems at the bank may be misplaced.
Interaffiliate funds transfers, including those that violate bank regulation, are very diffi-
cult for the regulators to discover. If the regulators do find that management has been
diverting bank funds to affiliates in violation of regulatory restrictions, they may have
limited means of punishing the violation, particularly if the bank is in financial difficulty.
Refusing to permit the bank to borrow from the discount window or to provide other
financial assistance to the ailing bank may punish bank management. But in deciding
what to do about a failing bank, the regulators must consider constituencies other than
the bank's management, including depositors, healthy banks that might be affected by
the failure, and the insurance fund itself. These considerations may prevent the regula-
tors from indulging in the luxury of revenge against management.
263. Regulation that limits or restricts funding and other asset transfers from banks to
nonbank affiliates is intended to discourage this kind of gambling. See supra note 218.
This regulation may discourage some individual abuses. Nevertheless, management's
incentives to bail out a failing nonbank affiliate may outweigh its fear of violating regula-
tory restrictions. Moreover, as will be described, existing rules do not prevent all oppor-
tunities for inefficient funds transfers among affiliates. See infra text accompanying note
330. Finally, regulation does not control the transfer of funds between divisions in a
single corporate entity. See supra note 223.
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C. The Hazard of Inefficient Management
Use of portfolio theory to evaluate the consequences of bank
diversification cannot take into account the special risks associated
with managing a diversified enterprise. By investing in different
companies with different managers, a portfolio investor has a
chance of diversifying away the risk of bad management at any one
company. In contrast, a conglomerate cannot eliminate the risk of
bad management by adding new divisions or affiliates. If the organi-
zation's management is unskilled or inattentive, all of its operations
may suffer.26
The risk of bad management is not unique to diversified bank-
ing organizations. But the combination of banking and nonbanking
activities may create some new risks that increase the opportunities
for, and the negative impact of, management error. For example,
studies of bank holding company management policies have found
that holding company banks tend to be more highly leveraged, and
more likely to be operated in a risky manner, than their independent
competitors. 265 This difference in approach to risk-taking may sim-
ply reflect the benefits of diversification, which enables a diversified
investor to accept relatively greater risk in any individual invest-
ment. 2 66 But examination of management policies in nonbank di-
versified conglomerates leads to a different conclusion as to the risk
preferences of conglomerate managers. These managers' apparent
preference for asset growth, even at the expense of profitability,
suggests that conglomerate managers are more risk averse than
their shareholders, a divergence that explains the market's recent
preference for deconglomeration.267
What then differentiates management risk in diversified banks
from management risk at any institution? This Section will explore
two special risks that appear to result from bank diversification.
First, efforts to integrate nonbanking with banking activities tend to
264. See Rhoades, Interstate Banking and Product Line Expansion: Implications from Available
Evidence, 18 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1115, 1153 (1985). Diversification studies tend to over-
look "operating risk," the risk that managers of an operation will do a relatively poor
job. Id.
265. See, e.g., Mayne, A Comparative Study of Bank Holding Company Affiliates and Independ-
ent Banks, 1969-1972, 32J. FIN. 147, 151 (1977); Mingo, Managerial Motives, Market Struc-
tures and the Performance of Holding Company Banks, 14 EcoN. INQUIRY 411, 420-21 (1976).
Evidence of the tendency of holding company banks to accept greater risk relative to
independent banks included their lower capital ratios and larger holdings of high yield-
ing, high risk assets. See Mayne, supra, at 151; Mingo, supra, at 420-21.
266. See supra text accompanying note 45.
267. See Coffee, supra note 103, at 16-24.
3651990]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
increase the risk of mismanagement in banking institutions. Sec-
ond, diversification itself creates pressure on management to oper-
ate the bank in a more risky fashion.
1. The Risk of Conglomerate Management.-Conglomerate man-
agement requires special skills that differ from those required for
management of undiversified businesses. The principal responsibil-
ities of conglomerate managers are long-term planning and re-
source allocation.268 Excessive involvement by central managers in
the actual operations of the diversified entity not only may be inef-
fective, given the limits of management's expertise and attention,
but also may distort management's perspective on the organization
as a whole.2 6 9 Ideally, conglomerate managers operate somewhat as
portfolio managers of a mutual fund, responsible for funds alloca-
tion, performance monitoring, and investment strategy.270
Even after deregulation, banking organizations are never likely
to become truly diversified conglomerates. 27' Nevertheless, the les-
sons of conglomerate management may be of use to managers of
banks that are diversified even on a limited scale. Effective planning
and control of a diverse operation require managers to maintain
some distance from day-to-day operations. One manager cannot
become expert in the details of each individual business.
Yet in banking organizations, management policy has tended to
be highly centralized. Studies of bank holding company operating
policies have found that holding company managers tend to exer-
cise extensive control over the structures and operations of both
bank and nonbank subsidiaries.2 72 Bank holding company officials
often serve as managers of bank and nonbank affiliates. 27' The
holding company frequently determines the liability and capital
structure of nonbank subsidiaries and may raise all of their funds.2 74
This intensive management involvement may be encouraged by reg-
ulatory policy that assigns responsibility to bank holding company
managers for the proper operation of bank and even nonbank sub-
268. See 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 119, at 148.
269. See id.
270. See id. at 148-49.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 170-18 1.
272. See Rose, Bank Holding Companies as Operational Single Entities, in THE BANK HOLD-
ING COMPANY MOVEMENT TO 1978: A COMPENDIUM 69, 85-86 (1978).
273. Id. at 85.
274. See id. Although the studies reviewed by Rose date from the 1970s, more recent
research confirms the continuation of this management style. See Eisenbeis, How Should
Bank Holding Companies Be Regulated?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., Jan.
1983, at 42, 43.
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sidiaries. The regulators evaluate bank holding company manage-
ment in approving applications for acquisitions of new
operations,275 and may penalize management if it engages in prac-
tices that directly or indirectly harm the bank.2 7 6
This management style creates special problems as bank diver-
sification continues. To the extent that bank holding company man-
agers are usually bankers,277 they may lack expertise in the new
nonbanking businesses. Although most of the new financial activi-
ties which banks enter today are very similar to traditional banking
functions in terms of customer base and even technology, years of
legal and regulatory isolation of the banking business from the re-
mainder of the financial services industry have resulted in the devel-
opment of very different operating philosophies, sales techniques,
and management styles. Meshing these distinct corporate cultures
has presented problems for banks seeking to enter new financial
activities.
This clash of cultures not only is likely to increase the costs of
diversifying acquisitions, but also may result in organizational ineffi-
ciencies for the banking organization struggling to adapt to new cor-
porate cultures. First, management initially may face high
information costs in monitoring newly acquired businesses with per-
formance structures and operating techniques different from those
of banking. Second, the bank may have difficulty imposing its own
organizational structure and procedures on its new acquisitions.
This may defeat some economies of scope, such as the ability to
share back office operations, expected from the acquisition. Finally,
management's lack of familiarity with the new businesses may dis-
tort its assessment of the acquisition's performance and funding
needs, leading to inefficient resource allocations. This uncertainty
may even cause bank executives to be overly conservative in manag-
ing new operations, thereby forgoing profits.2 7 8
275. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1988) (in considering bank holding company applica-
tions for acquisition of new banks, the Federal Reserve Board considers the financial and
managerial resources of the bank holding companies and banks involved); 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.24 (1989) (in considering bank holding company applications for entry into or
acquisition of new nonbanking operations, the Board considers the financial and mana-
gerial resources of the bank holding company and its subsidiaries as well as any com-
pany to be acquired).
276. See supra text accompanying note 174.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 172-173.
278. These kinds of problems usually are expected in firms attempting to integrate
foreign operations, particularly those located in countries culturally dissimilar to the
United States. See Gatignon & Anderson, The Multinational Corporation's Degree of Control
over Foreign Subsidiaries: An Empirical Test of a Transition Cost Explanation, 4 J. L. ECON. &
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Many of these problems have arisen as banks have entered the
securities business. Some banks have chosen to staff their new oper-
ations with personnel hired away from investment banks to gain in-
stant expertise in securities market practices. 79 Integration of these
investment banking specialists with traditional lending officers has
proved difficult. Investment bankers tend to be compensated on a
different basis than traditional commercial bankers.280 Investment
bankers generally are expert in particular types of financing, while
commercial bankers traditionally concentrate on developing individ-
ual relationships with a few corporate clients. 28 1 These differences
inevitably lead to antagonisms between the old and the new bank
employees.282
Efficient integration of the new securities operations also has
been complicated by the different client relationships that character-
ize the investment and commercial banking industries. The securi-
ties industry is in the business of selling products to customers.
Although long established corporate relationships are significant to
some investment banking firms, most firms today are aggressive
marketers of services. Corporate customers can afford to pick and
choose among competing investment bankers, and are more im-
pressed by the number and variety of financings that a potential in-
vestment banker has arranged than by the names on the banker's
client list.
Until recently, commercial bankers have not been forced to
market their services aggressively. Many bankers assume that ag-
gressive marketing taints the bank's reputation for impartiality and
probity.2 83 Bankers' reluctance to become aggressive marketers of
financial products has hindered banks in selling their new securities
services in competition with the investment banks.28"
ORGANIZATION 305, 309 (1988). Fifty years of legal isolation has made the corporate
culture of investment banking and other nonbank industries very foreign to banks.
279. See, e.g., Neustadt, supra note 257, at 2, col. 2 (Bankers Trust hires former chief
financial officer at Salomon to head new merchant banking group).
280. Bonuses based on profits traditionally have been far more important-and more
lucrative-in the investment banking industry than in the commercial banking industry.
See Hayes, supra note 190, at 58.
281. See Dickey, It's a Bird, It's a Plane... It's a Bank?, 5 BANK EXPANSION REP., Oct. 6,
1986, at 1, 10-11; see also Hayes, supra note 190, at 58.
282. This antagonism can impair the ability of traditional commercial bankers to mar-
ket new securities products or to work in conjunction with investment bankers. See
Hayes, supra note 190, at 58.
283. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 632 (1971).
284. See, e.g., Shovitz, Sales Efforts Slumber at Financial Institutions, Am. Banker, Oct. 31,
1988, at 1, col. 2. Although some securities services such as private placements draw on
a bank's existing customer base and thus afford easy entry for banks, entry into even
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Of course, the problem of integrating corporate cultures is
likely to be temporary. Further experience with diversification
should enable most banks to adapt their corporate cultures. 28 5 Nev-
ertheless, the cost of adaptation often is underestimated by propo-
nents of deregulation, who assume that the risk-reducing effect of
diversification is automatic.28 6 Moreover, although banks could
lower integration costs by adopting less centralized governance
structures for nonbanking operations, 2 7 bank regulation itself en-
courages highly centralized management. 288  This poses a risk for
banks seeking to diversify into unfamiliar industries. If operating
mistakes at individual banking organizations lead to serious losses
or even failure, those banks never will have the chance to adapt to
new corporate cultures. This risk is greater if deregulation occurs
rapidly. Sudden deregulation may pressure banks to enter too many
new businesses too quickly without the luxury of time to adjust their
existing organization to new corporate cultures.289
2. Risky Banks.-Bank diversification may create another new
management risk: the danger that management will operate its
traditional banking business in a riskier manner. Several explana-
tions may account for this increased risk at diversified banks. The
decision to diversify itself may indicate that management is more
these businesses has been slowed by marketing problems, including bank loan officers'
unwillingness or inability to sell securities services to borrowers. See Neustadt, supra
note 186, at 1, col. 1.
285. Many banks, especially those with longer experience in the securities business,
already are doing so. See Dickey, supra note 281, at 10.
286. The cost of integrating corporate cultures also may be underestimated by the
banks themselves when they enter new businesses. See, e.g., Kutler, Turnaround at Citicorp
Unit Ushers in Era of Glasnost, Am. Banker, Feb. 8, 1989, at 8, col. 1 (describing problems
experienced by Citicorp in integrating independent data processing companies follow-
ing their acquisition); cf. Kitching, supra note 181, at 91-92 (noting that many concentric
mergers may fail because management assumes that integration of similar businesses is
easy).
287. See Gatignon & Anderson, supra note 278, at 307.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 272-276.
289. An example of the pitfalls of too rapid an entry into new activities is the record of
many participants, including securities affiliates of United States banks, in the London
securities market. The affiliates, already experiencing problems in breaking into the
competitive London market, had to adjust to the deregulation of London's financial
markets in October 1986 and the stock market crash in October 1987. Many affiliates
experienced internal control and management problems, which were exacerbated by
competitive pressures. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK POWERS: ISSUES RE-
LATED TO REPEAL OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT (GAO/GDC-88-37) (Jan. 1988). Because
regulation limited the aggregate exposure of the affiliates, however, no bank exper-
ienced major losses. See supra note 156 (limits on equity underwriting overseas).
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aggressive than average. 290 Alternatively, management of a diversi-
fied bank may feel pressure to squeeze additional profits from all of
its operations to offset the premium paid to acquire new nonbank-
ing businesses. 291' These answers do not explain why managers of
diversified banks are less risk-averse than managers of undiversified
banks. Aggressive management may be found in undiversified as
well as diversified banks. Acquisitions of banks as well as nonbanks
may require payment of substantial premiums.
Diversification itself may create special pressures to operate the
bank in a riskier fashion. In an undiversified bank, there is no com-
petition for funding among different businesses. Diversification im-
poses new demands upon the banking organization for funds. If the
bank is not a large contributor to the profits of the organization,
investors may pressure management to allocate available funds to
more successful operations. This pressure is exacerbated by regula-
tion that imposes costs on the operations of the bank, but not on
nonbank affiliates. For example, bank capital requirements impose
a minimum capital to asset ratio upon banks.2 9 2 These standards
effectively require a bank to increase its capital for every new dollar
of loans. Management therefore may prefer .to take banking profits
and invest them in nonbanking operations rather than in additional
loans.
Moreover, regulation that restricts the ability of management to
shift funds from bank to nonbank affiliates may contribute to pres-
sure to operate the bank in a risky fashion. If management is limited
in its ability to adjust the capital and holdings of its bank to assist
other affiliates, it will be reluctant to make additional equity invest-
ments in its bank affiliate. Management also will look for ways to
shift funds out of the bank legally, for example, by causing the bank
to pay dividends to its holding company up to the maximum allowed
by law.293
Finally, managers of a diversified banking organization may be
reluctant to take funds from nonbanking operations to assist a fail-
ing bank. The bank's heavy dependence on deposits for funding
means that, upon failure, depositors' claims will exhaust any remain-
290. See Mingo, supra note 265, at 413.
291. See supra text accompanying note 128.
292. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. A (1989) (state member banks). Bank holding
companies also are subject to capital to asset requirements, but the holding company's
investment in and the assets of certain nonbank affiliates are excluded from the calcula-
tion. See infra note 325.
293. See supra note 207.
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ing assets. If a deposit run occurs, any funds transferred into the
bank immediately must be paid out to satisfy depositors. The bank's
shareholders (in many cases, a bank holding company) can expect to
lose their entire investment.
This risk of loss ordinarily should have the beneficial effect of
causing shareholders and managers to avoid bank failure. But the
growth of diversified bank holding companies with both bank and
nonbank affiliates may affect this aversion to failure. If a subsidiary
bank fails, the bank holding company cannot expect to recover its
investment. But if the holding company has healthy nonbank affili-
ates, it can afford to allow the bank to fail. Moreover, the holding
company has no incentive to contribute nonbank assets to help re-
pay bank depositors. If nonbank assets can be sheltered from the
bank, the deposit insurance fund will bear the cost of reimbursing
the bank's depositors after the bank's own assets are exhausted.
Of course, bank failure still has negative consequences for the
entire diversified organization, injuring the firm's reputation and
ability to offer related financial services.29 4 Nevertheless, once the
bank's problems become known and any resulting damage to the
diversified banking organization is inevitable, management may pre-
fer to let the bank fail rather than to deplete nonbanking resources
to keep the bank alive.295 In any case, pressure from the organiza-
tion's capital suppliers may make it difficult for management to jus-
tify massive transfers of resources to a troubled bank.2 9 6
D. Why Do the Hazards Matter?
The previous sections identified three potential hazards that
may result from wholesale repeal of restrictions on bank diversifica-
tion. Nevertheless, the question remains why these hazards should
294. See supra text accompanying notes 251-260.
295. This was the strategy of the management of MCorp, a Texas bank holding com-
pany that appealed to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for financial
assistance for its failing subsidiary banks but refused to contribute healthy nonbank as-
sets to support the bank's capital. Klinkerman, MCorp Gains Upper Hand in Rescue Talks,
Am. Banker, Nov. 8, 1988, at 1, col. 4. Even if the failure of the bank leads to the
bankruptcy of the entire diversified organization, more assets will remain for holding
company claimants.
296. Bank holding company shareholders and debtholders will resist the transfer of
holding company assets to a troubled bank, because those assets will be depleted imme-
diately in paying off depositors. As bank holding company investors are likely to be
more sophisticated and better informed than depositors, they are likely to take prompt
action to punish such funds transfers by refusing to invest in the holding company. For
further discussion of the problems that may arise when a subsidiary bank of a diversified
bank holding company fails, see infra text accompanying notes 304-311.
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be taken seriously in fashioning future bank regulatory policy. Crit-
ics of regulation may admit that diversification can increase bank
risk in the ways that this Article describes. Yet they still may argue
that these consequences of deregulation do not justify regulatory
concern.
This suggests the need to evaluate the new subtle hazards by
reference to the two guidelines previously suggested for determin-
ing the need for regulatory intervention.297 Under these guidelines,
the subtle hazards warrant a regulatory response if they interfere
with the achievement of a significant regulatory goal in ways that
cannot be prevented by alternative control mechanisms. The most
significant goal of bank regulation is to prevent the risk of multiple
bank failures that could impede the functioning of the banking sys-
tem. Although quantifying systemic risk has proved very difficult,
most observers agree that, at some point, additional bank failures
are undesirable and that certain regulatory tools must be in place to
prevent them. These tools, which work with varying degrees of ef-
fectiveness, include deposit insurance, central bank lending to pri-
vate banks, and some form of government involvement in dealing
with the consequences of bank failure.2 °8
How may the new subtle hazards interfere with this goal of bank
regulation? If diversification does not necessarily reduce bank risk,
and may actually increase it in the ways that this Article describes,
two problems arise for bank regulatory policy. First, more bank risk
means more bank failure, both in the short-run during any transi-
tion period as banks adjust to deregulation and in the long-run.
Second, and perhaps more important, bank diversification itself
means that if bank failure occurs, it will become increasingly costly
and complex for the regulatory system to handle. These problems,
although interrelated, are explored separately in this Section.
1. The Problem of More Frequent Failure.-Any bank deregulation
is likely to increase the risk of bank failure. In the short-run, the fact
of regulatory change itself will have an impact on the industry.
Some individual institutions will be unable to adapt to the new com-
petitive environment and will fail. In the long-run, diversification
creates new managerial and organizational hazards for banks.
These new hazards will make bank management a more difficult
task, increasing the chance of mistakes and failure.
297. See supra notes 105-117 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
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Some critics may argue that increased failure is not a concern
for bank regulatory policy. More frequent bank failure is not unde-
sirable if failure serves to weed out weak and inefficient players. In-
efficiently managed banks eventually may fail anyway. Deregulation
simply hastens their demise. The threat of failure serves as a warn-
ing to other managers to take special care in running their diversi-
fied banks.
Even if one accepts the view that failure serves the beneficial
function of eliminating weak banks,299 more frequent failure still
poses a problem for the regulatory system. So long as the safety net
is in place to deal with the consequences of bank failure, the cost of
any individual failure must include the cost to the safety net itself.
At a minimum, bank failure requires reimbursement of depositors
out of the insurance fund. It also may require central bank lending
to the failing institution and a substantial investment of regulatory
time and effort either to liquidate the bank's assets or arrange an
alternative disposition, such as a federally assisted merger.3 0 0 Too
many bank failures may impose too heavy a burden on this safety
net3ol
One solution to this dilemma is to do something about the
safety net. For example, if too many bank failures strain the safety
net, portions of the net could be removed, for example, by reducing
deposit insurance coverage. Yet these kinds of reforms are apt to
spawn their own new risks. Drastic changes in insurance coverage
may affect the ability of the deposit insurance system to achieve its
goal of preventing systemic risk. If cutbacks in insurance coverage
lead to depositor panic and loss of confidence in banks, then the
very danger that deposit insurance was designed to prevent may be-
come a reality. Neither regulators nor deregulators can afford to
take that risk.3 0 2
299. This assumption is subject to some question. Experience suggests that the na-
ture of the banking business, particularly the constant exposure to liquidity risk, subjects
banks to external risks that cannot always be foreseen and prevented even by good man-
agers. See Garten, supra note 78, at 153-56. Thus, to assume that bank failure is con-
fined to bad banks is an oversimplification. It may be more accurate to say that the
nature of the banking business makes the consequences of management mistakes more
serious than in other businesses.
300. See supra note 111.
301. This problem was illustrated by the crisis in the savings and loan industry. The
thrift insurance fund was not adequate to handle the increased rate of thrift failure.
Thrift regulators were reluctant to close insolvent institutions to avoid bankrupting the
fund. See McTague, Many Hands Pulled the Plug on Thrifts, Am. Banker, Oct. 28, 1988, at
1, col. 2.
302. Ideally, the safety net should be preserved for those situations for which it was
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Further, it is unclear why the drastic step of reworking the
safety net is necessarily preferable to continuing some regulatory
restrictions on bank diversification. The principal benefit that is
claimed to result from diversification is that bank risk thereby will be
reduced, not increased. If more banks fail as a result of deregula-
tion, then this justification for regulatory reform is flawed. A good
example is provided by the savings and loan crisis. Deregulation of
permissible thrift investments was intended to help the industry
boost its earnings and reduce risk in its traditional narrow lending
businesses. Diversification only contributed to the industry's
problems, both because of management problems and too rapid de-
regulation. This in turn put pressure on the insurance fund,
prompting restoration of restrictive regulation.30 3
This experience offers a lesson for bank regulation. Because
repairing damage to the safety net is very difficult, it may be more
efficient to deal directly with the new risks of diversification by look-
ing carefully at the need for regulatory reform. The solution may be
either to halt further diversification, or to attempt to develop a regu-
latory approach that can minimize the specific hazards created by
diversification.
2. The Problem of More Complex Failure.-Perhaps a more serious
consequence of bank diversification is what happens after bank fail-
ure occurs. Traditionally, bank failure had relatively predictable
consequences for the regulatory system, bank investors, and man-
agement. The investments of insured depositors, and often even of
uninsured creditors of the bank, were protected, either by deposit
insurance or by the transfer of the failed bank's liabilities to a
healthy bank.30 4 The bank's assets, consisting principally of loans,
were either sold to the acquiring bank or liquidated for the benefit
of remaining creditors, including the deposit insurance fund. In
either case, the bank's shareholders lost their investments. Bank
managers lost their jobs. °5
intended, namely, bank failures that pose systemic risks. The safety net should not bear
the cost of failures of "bad" banks that serve a beneficial function. Although this is an
attractive notion, in practice, it may be impossible to make such a fine distinction be-
tween different failures.
303. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (to be codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (reregu-
lating thrift institutions).
304. See supra note 111.
305. The bank regulators also have the option of providing direct financial assistance
to prevent a bank from failing. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (1988). As a condition to granting
this assistance, however, the regulators generally have required that the bank raise new
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If the bank was owned by a holding company, the results were
almost identical. Because the bank tended to be the holding com-
pany's principal asset, the failure of the bank generally resulted in
the bankruptcy of the holding company. The only mystery was
whether, in any regulatory disposition of the bank, creditors of the
holding company would lose their investments or be protected
along with the bank's creditors.30 6
Diversification by banking organizations greatly complicates
procedures for dealing with bank failure. One problem is simply
that of size. As banks expand into new activities, the value of the
failed bank's assets may be difficult to determine. Arranging the
merger of a large diversified bank is harder than selling a small
bank. It is unclear how potential purchasers will value nonbanking
businesses. Businesses such as brokerages may have few tangible
assets, but derive their value from reputation, human capital, and
established customer relationships. These firm-specific assets may
be worth very little after failure of the bank.
Diversification complicates bank failure policy in another way.
Bank failure policy always has had to balance the goal of protecting
depositors and the banking system against the danger of removing
incentives for managers and investors to operate banks responsibly.
Although regulatory dispositions of failed banks result in the pro-
tection of all insured depositors and often other creditors of the
bank, the regulators have tried to ensure that equityholders and
managers pay some price for bank failure." 7 When a banking or-
ganization has significant nonbank as well as bank affiliates, the fail-
ure of a bank does not necessarily result in the bankruptcy of the
entire organization and losses for equity investors and managers.
These stakeholders have less reason to fear bank failure when the
organization has sufficient nonbank assets to survive as an operating
private capital (thereby reducing the interests of existing shareholders) and replace
management. See First City Rescue, supra note 175, at 87,067 (financial assistance plan
conditioned on reduction of existing shareholders' interest to less than three percent
and replacement of management).
306. In providing assistance to Continental, the regulators protected creditors of the
bank holding company as well as insured and uninsured depositors and other creditors
of the bank. See Morris & Weiner, U.S. Rescues Continental Illinois Corp., Am. Banker, May
18, 1984, at 1, col. 2. More recently, the regulators have refused to protect holding
company creditors. See Klinkerman, First Republic Creditors Sue FDIC for $700 Million, Am.
Banker, Nov. 4, 1988, at 8, col. 2 (creditors of bankrupt holding company object to
regulatory disposition of company's failed bank subsidiaries, which resulted in the trans-
fer of the company's valuable bank assets to an acquiring bank).
307. See supra text accompanying note 305.
3751990]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
entity.3°8
Moreover, although the failure of a bank subsidiary should have
a negative effect on the rest of the organization, 309 bank failure pro-
cedures may unintentionally minimize these costs. Because of the
danger of depositor panic, the regulators may prefer to avoid pub-
licity about a bank's problems. The regulators may provide financial
assistance to keep a failing bank open. They may attempt to arrange
a rapid disposition of the bank to minimize deposit outflows and
further cost to the insurance fund. Bank holding company share-
holders and managers may emerge from bank failure relatively
quickly with nonbanking assets intact.
Finally, the presence of nonbank affiliates may provide manage-
ment with a bargaining chip when it appeals to the bank regulators
for assistance for failing subsidiary banks. The regulators would
prefer that the banking organization contribute its own funds to as-
sist in rescuing the bank. Management has no incentive voluntarily
to transfer assets from its healthy operations to help pay off bank
depositors or facilitate the sale of the failing bank.3 l ° In order to
persuade management to make such a contribution, the regulators
may have to grant concessions or delay disposition of the failing
bank, which ultimately may impose greater costs on the insurance
fund.311
The possibility that diversification will complicate bank failure
policy is not an insurmountable barrier to deregulation. Neverthe-
less, before deregulation can proceed, some plan must be in place to
deal with the consequences of more frequent and more complex
bank failure. These dangers are serious enough to require a transi-
tional approach to deregulation. The aim of such an approach is to
permit controlled experimentation with diversification to determine
if in fact it will result in hazards to the financial system. The remain-
der of this Article considers whether such an approach is possible.
III. REGULATING TRANSITIONS: THE FIREWALL SOLUTION
Few proponents of increased bank powers are willing to risk the
unpredictable consequences of total deregulation. Reform propos-
308. See supra text accompanying notes 294-296.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 240-250.
310. See supra text accompanying note 295.
311. For example, MCorp's refusal to contribute its nonbanking assets to help bail out
its failing subsidiary banks delayed for months the FDIC's efforts to find a solution. See
supra note 295; see also Klinkerman, MCorp Rescue Talks Bog Down, Am. Banker, Jan. 17,
1989, at 1, col. 2.
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als have contemplated some continued regulation of bank diversifi-
cation. Most frequently, this regulation has taken the form of
firewalls that are designed to separate, structurally and operation-
ally, the traditional banking business from the new nonbanking
businesses. The firewall approach has its philosophical antecedents
in conflict of interest regulation developed for diversified nonbank
financial firms.'" 2 It also reflects the typical organization of a diver-
sified conglomerate with separately operated, nearly autonomous
business divisions.
Although firewalls have been part of most legislative proposals
to reform the Glass-Steagall Act and other restrictive banking legis-
lation, their real importance results from their inclusion in regula-
tory and judicial approvals of new bank powers.Sil To the extent
that banks already have been permitted to diversify, they are con-
ducting their new operations in the shadow of the firewall. Yet as a
transitional solution to the hazards of deregulation, the firewall is
faultily designed. First, the firewall fails to address the most serious
hazards that result from bank diversification. Second, the firewall
actually may increase these hazards by mandating organizational
and management policies that are both risky and inefficient.
A. The Bricks of the Firewall
The principal goal of firewall regulation is to isolate traditional
banking operations, both physically, financially, and legally, from
nonbanking activities. Although details may vary, the design of
most firewalls is very similar. This Section describes the "bricks" of
the typical firewall that has been required as a condition to bank
entry into new nonbanking activities.
First, the new nonbanking activities must be conducted in sepa-
rate subsidiaries from the bank itself.314 This legal separation fol-
lows the approach of the Bank Holding Company Act, which
requires nonbanking activities to be conducted through subsidiaries
of the holding company.31 5 Separate incorporation is designed not
only to deny creditors of a nonbanking business recourse to bank
assets, but also to discourage joint management and decision-mak-
ing. Thus, certain management interlocks between bank and non-
312. See supra text accompanying note 80.
313. See infra text accompanying notes 314-326.
314. See, e.g., Bank Underwriting Decision, supra note 27, at 202 (separate underwriting
affiliates).
315. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
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bank affiliates also have been prohibited. 6
Second, strict limits are placed on the ability of the bank to fund
its nonbank affiliates. Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act places
restrictions on a bank's extensions of credit to or purchases of assets
from its nonbank affiliates) 7 Section 23B requires that transac-
tions between a bank and its nonbank affiliates, including furnishing
of services, be on terms comparable to arm's length transactions. 18
Regulatory approvals of bank entry into particular nonbank activi-
ties, such as underwriting corporate securities, have required even
higher firewalls, for example, forbidding virtually all lending by a
bank to its nonbank affiliate. 19
Third, nonbank affiliates must make extensive disclosures to
customers that they are separate legal entities from the bank and
that their obligations are not protected by deposit insurance. 2 °
Such disclosure is intended to prevent public confusion of the bank
with its nonbank affiliates. Occasionally, the nonbank affiliate even
has been required to have a different name and separate offices from
the bank itself 3 21
Fourth, some restrictions are placed on the joint marketing of
bank and nonbank products. For example, prospectuses and sales
literature relating to securities underwritten or traded by an affiliate
may not be distributed by the bank. 22 Although banks and their
nonbank affiliates may share customer lists, direct solicitation of
bank depositors by nonbank affiliates is limited. 23 Moreover, banks
and their affiliates may not share confidential credit information
316. See National Westminster Bank PLC, supra note 189, at 588 (no officer or director
interlocks between bank and brokerage affiliate). But see Bankers Trust New York Co., supra
note 255, at 698 (permitting bank officer to serve as director of brokerage affiliate).
317. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988). Section 23A does not forbid all interaffiliate funds
transfers. Banks may make advances to nonbank affiliates in amounts not in excess of
10% of the bank's stock and surplus for each affiliate, id. § 371c(a)(1)(A), and 20% for
all affiliates, id. § 371c(a)(l)(B). Advances secured by United States government obliga-
tions or by deposits in the bank are permitted without restriction. Id. § 371c(d)(4).
318. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (1988).
319. See Bank Underwriting Decision, supra note 27, 206-07.
320. See, e.g., Bank of New England Corp., supra note 153, at 703.
321. See National Westminster Bank PLC, supra note 189, at 588. But cf. I.P. Morgan & Co.,
Inc., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 810, 813 (1987) (allowing bank and brokerage affiliate to have
similar names).
322. See Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra note 28, at 495.
323. See Bank of New England Corp., supra note 153, at 701 n.6 (brokerage affiliate may
use bank customer lists for mass mailings but not individual solicitation). But see Bankers
Trust New York Co., supra note 255, at 697 (bank may introduce institutional clients to
affiliated broker's services).
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about customers, particularly retail customers.324
Fifth, nonbank affiliates must be-capitalized independently to
avoid impairment of the resources of the holding company and the
affiliated bank. The holding company may invest in some nonbank
affiliates only with capital above the amounts necessary to meet the
minimum capital to assets requirements for bank holding compa-
nies. 325 In some cases, advances made by the holding company to
nonbank affiliates must be deducted from the holding company's
capital unless they are fully secured by government or other market-
able securities.326
This summary suggests that the firewall consists principally of
rules prohibiting specific conflicts of interest in diversified banking
organizations. The firewall is designed to respond to the question
left unanswered in Investment Co. Institute v. Camp:327 Why cannot
each of the hazards mentioned by Camp be prevented by narrowly
drawn regulation that addresses the specific undesirable practices?
If such rules can be developed, then the rationale for restricting all
bank securities activities, or other nonbanking activities,
disappears.3 28
Is the firewall an adequate solution to the hazards that may re-
sult from bank diversification? Although the firewall may be effec-
tive in deterring some individual abuses by banks, it does not
address the real concerns raised by diversification. Like all conflict
of interest rules, the firewall is designed to create counterincentives
to temptations for individual banks to engage in abuses. For exam-
ple, any gain in the form of trading profits that a banking organiza-
tion can make by revealing confidential information about bank
borrowers to a securities affiliate may be outweighed by the high
324. See Bank of New England Corp., supra note 153, at 701 n.6 (no exchange of confi-
dential information concerning retail customers); Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 74
Fed. Res. Bull. 571, 572 (1988) (exchange of confidential information about institutional
customers permitted only with such customers' consent).
325. Thus, investments in nonbank affiliates must be deducted from the bank holding
company's consolidated capital in applying regulatory standards. See Bank Underwriting
Decision, supra note 27, at 205.
326. Id. at 205-06.
327. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
328. Critics of firewalls may argue that conflict of interest rules are too easily evaded.
Yet the firewall is more sturdy than ordinary conflict of interest rules. For example,
placing nonbanking activities in separately incorporated affiliates prevents some oppor-
tunities for commingling bank and nonbank funds and other abuses that might be diffi-
cult for regulators or investors to detect. In fact, the firewalls occasionally may work too
well, creating peculiar management problems for banking organizations. See infra text
accompanying notes 341-344.
3791990]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
cost of violating rules against exchanging such information, includ-
ing fines, negative publicity, and loss of reputation. Likewise, the
firewall may make some abuses so difficult that most banks may be
deterred from attempting violations. For example, forcing banks to
put nonbanking operations in separately managed and capitalized
affiliates may prevent many opportunities for conflicts of interest
that arise within unitary organizations.
Nevertheless, the real hazards created by diversification are not
these specific abuses, but more general problems of organization,
funding, and management in complex organizations. Since the fire-
wall does not address management's motives to engage in abuses
such as inefficient cross-funding, it may not be very effective in de-
terring such conduct. For example, the existence of rules restricting
interaffiliate funds transfers provides some incentive for manage-
ment to avoid violations for fear of detection and punishment by
bank regulators. But if management is motivated by fear of loss of
reputation or of essential services as a result of the failure of a non-
bank affiliate, even law-abiding management may feel justified in ig-
noring regulatory restrictions.329
Further, management has an incentive to find ways to evade the
restrictions, thus vitiating their effectiveness. For example, the fire-
wall does not prevent all bank funding of nonbank affiliates. Man-
agement of a diversified bank holding company always can obtain
funds from the bank by causing it to pay dividends up to the limits
allowable under applicable banking laws and then allocating those
funds exclusively to nonbank operations."3 ' This suggests that
when firewalls conflict with organizational incentives, management
will rationalize evasions and even violations on the basis of business
need, including the interests of depositors and shareholders.
Perhaps the best evidence of the inability of the firewall to ad-
dress the hazards of diversification is past experience with very simi-
lar restrictions. Before the Glass-Steagall Act was passed, a form of
329. See supra text accompanying notes 240-263. The Federal Reserve Board has ad-
mitted that restrictions on interaffiliate funds transfers frequently have been violated or
interpreted creatively by management in times of stress. See Bank Undenrwiting Decision,
supra note 27, at 206.
330. Restrictions on holding company advances to nonbank affiliates may make this
funds allocation more difficult. See supra text accompanying note 326. This additional
restriction on cross-funding itself was necessitated by the continuing efforts of bankers
to scale earlier firewalls. This suggests that any new firewall may impede banks' efforts
to fund affiliates for a while, but that banks eventually will find a way to evade it. As
incentives to violate the firewall are apparently so strong, perhaps the firewall approach
is not the most efficient way to address the problem of cross-funding.
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firewall was in place between banks and their securities affiliates.
Most banks engaged in securities operations through separately cap-
italized affiliates which often were not owned by the bank or even
the bank's holding company, but directly by the bank's sharehold-
ers.3 3 1 Moreover, bank shareholders risked double liability on their
shares in the event of bank failure. 332 This double liability not only
should have provided an additional source of funds for depositors in
failing banks, but also should have caused shareholders to put pres-
sure on management to discourage practices that could lead to bank
failure.333 Nevertheless, these firewalls apparently were not sturdy
enough to prevent abuses by banks in 1933. Modern-day firewalls
are not likely to be much stronger.
B. Structural Weaknesses in the Firewall
In addition to failing to address the significant hazards created
by bank diversification, in some cases, the firewall may exacerbate
these hazards. By mandating a particular organizational and man-
agement structure for diversified banking organizations, the firewall
interferes with banks' efforts to integrate new businesses effectively
with existing operations. In addition, the organizational structure
required by the firewall may have unintended consequences for
banks and for bank regulation.
1. The Incredible Shrinking Bank.-The firewall forces banks to
diversify through a holding company structure. Ideally, this struc-
ture allows the banking organization as a whole to obtain the advan-
tages of diversification while discouraging the use of bank assets to
support nonbank activities. Moreover, the holding company struc-
ture facilitates the construction of other firewalls, such as limits on
funding, joint marketing, and sharing information between banking
and nonbanking operations.
331. See Note, Securities Affiliates of National Banks: The Legal Aspects, 33 COLUM. L. REV.
324, 326 (1933). One reason why direct shareholder ownership of the affiliate was pref-
erable to the bank holding company structure was that courts tended to disregard the
separate corporate identities of holding company affiliates. Id.
332. For a discussion of these assessability provisions, see Vincens, On the Demise of
Double Liability of Bank Shareholders, 75 BANKING L.J. 213 (1975).
333. As a practical matter, assessability of bank shares did not provide much addi-
tional financial support for depositors. See Note, Branch, Chain, and Group Banking, 48
HARV. L. REV. 659, 669 n.77 (1935) (problems in collecting assessments from sharehold-
ers). The threat of double liability, however, should have made bank shareholders, in-
cluding bank holding company shareholders, more risk averse. See Anderson v. Abbott,
321 U.S. 349, 357 (1944) (assessing bank holding company shareholders upon failure of
subsidiary bank).
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Nevertheless, the holding company is unlikely to be the most
efficient organizational structure for a diversified bank. Bank diver-
sification is motivated by opportunities for cross-selling related
products to existing customers. Thus, any legal separation between
banking and nonbanking operations is somewhat artificial. In prac-
tice, although nonbanking activities formally are located in separate
affiliates, banks are trying to manage their different businesses as
integrated operations.334 As a result, many regulatory restrictions
on joint operation, particularly joint marketing of traditional bank-
ing and nonbanking products, that originally were imposed as a con-
dition to bank entry into new activities have been either dismantled
or ignored. For example, early regulatory approvals of bank entry
into securities activities required that the activities be performed
through separate affiliates with separate names, employees, and of-
fices from the bank.335 Recent approvals have permitted more and
more joint operations between banks and their securities affiliates,
including sharing of customer lists, 33 6 joint advertising,3 3 7 and even
the direct solicitation of bank customers by sellers of nonbank prod-
ucts. 338 This relaxation of restrictions reflects the futility of at-
tempting to prevent integrated development and marketing of
functionally related products.33 9
Other portions of the firewall also may force banking organiza-
tions to adopt inefficient management strategies. Because the fire-
wall restricts management's flexibility in allocating funds among
banking and nonbanking operations, it will affect management's di-
versification strategy. Assume that management is deciding where
in the holding company structure to place a profitable new opera-
tion. If the operation is located in the bank, the holding company's
future ability to draw on its earnings for the benefit of the rest of the
organization is limited by the firewall. The bank cannot share its
profits with nonbank affiliates. If such affiliates buy services from
the bank, management will have to demonstrate that the terms of
any interaffiliate transaction replicate an arm's-length bargain.
Thus, management may prefer to shrink the bank, locating profita-
334. See supra text accompanying notes 252-254.
335. See, e.g., National Westminster Bank PLC, supra note 189, at 588.
336. See, e.g., Sovran Financial Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 504, 505 (1988).
337. See, e.g., Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, supra note 324, at 572.
338. See, e.g., Bankers Trust New York Co., supra note 255, at 697.
339. See Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, supra note 324, at 571 (removing restric-
tions on sharing of securities research and recommendations between brokerage affiliate
and lending banks on the ground of impossibility of preventing information flows).
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ble operations in nonbank affiliates that are not subject to any of
these restrictions.
Shrinking the bank has several implications for regulatory pol-
icy. Shifting operations out of the bank into nonbank affiliates is
likely to increase operational dependencies between banks and their
affiliates. This may increase incentives to use bank funds to bail out
a failing affiliate.340 Moreover, if banks become smaller and rela-
tively less important components of the diversified banking organi-
zation, management will have even less reason to allocate a
disproportionate amount of funds to banking operations, particu-
larly when they are experiencing financial difficulties.
2. The Collapsible Firewall.-Ironically, in some respects, the
firewall may work too well. At times, even the regulators may prefer
that banking organizations disregard the walls that they carefully
have constructed between affiliates. For example, joint marketing of
banking and nonbanking products often is desirable to promote
sales of banking services. If the firewall makes it difficult for bankers
to acquaint their borrowers with nonbanking services, the banks
may lose their customers to competing nonbank firms. Thus, the
firewall itself may contribute to the banks' problems in successfully
selling their new financial products. 4'
The firewall may even have some undesirable effects in the
event of failure of one or more parts of the diversified banking or-
ganization. If a nonbank affiliate is failing, the firewall prevents use
of bank assets to bail out the affiliate. Even the bank regulators oc-
casionally encourage banks to support their nonbank affiliates when
the failure of those affiliates would have a direct negative impact on
the bank itself. 42
If a bank is failing, the regulators do not want the firewall to
restrict use of nonbank assets to bail out the bank. In fact, the regu-
lators prefer that such cross-funding takes place. Allowing the bank
to have access to nonbank assets in the event of bank failure not
only makes failure resolution cheaper, but also encourages manage-
ment and shareholders of the diversified banking organization to
operate the bank in a manner that minimizes the chance of failure.
Although the firewall does not prevent the use of nonbank as-
340. See supra text accompanying note 255.
341. Recognition of this problem has led to the dismantling of some firewalls, particu-
larly restrictions on cross-marketing of banking and nonbanking services. See supra text
accompanying notes 336-339.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 220-221.
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sets to benefit the bank, it may frustrate efforts by the regulators to
compel such a contribution. The more solid the firewall, the harder
it becomes for the regulators to take the position that nonbank affili-
ates are not independent entities and should be collapsed into the
bank upon insolvency. Moreover, if the firewall successfully pre-
vents bank funding of nonbank affiliates, the regulators cannot ar-
gue that nonbank assets were bought with bank funds or otherwise
belong to the bank.
Thus, even the regulators may not favor impregnable firewalls.
The ideal firewall would be collapsible, to be removed on occasions
when joint operation, funding, and management of bank and non-
bank affiliates makes regulatory sense. Yet designing this kind of
firewall is impossible. If bank holding companies were prohibited
from transferring bank funds to nonbanking operations, but were
required to use nonbank funds to bail out failing banking opera-
tions, 43 the result would be undesirable for the bank holding com-
pany, its investors, and ultimately the regulatory system. Investors
in diversified bank holding companies would insist on high premi-
ums to compensate for the increased risk. 4 4 If the bank holding
company's cost of funds became too high, management would feel
even greater pressure to ignore the firewall and raise funds for the
entire organization through the bank. Otherwise, the holding com-
pany would have no nonbank assets that could be reached by the
regulators in the event of bank failure.
More fundamentally, the preference for a collapsible firewall
suggests a basic problem with the firewall approach. The firewall is
not a transitional solution to the potential problems of deregulation,
but a permanent regulatory structure that will shape the organiza-
tion of diversified banks. Like the regulatory restrictions it is replac-
ing, the firewall will have an impact on the future organization,
management, and operation of the banking industry. Yet limited
experience with the firewall shows that some of these effects are un-
desirable. This suggests that a better transitional approach to de-
regulation is one that is more easily dismantled should experience
demonstrate that the new regulatory approach is unwise.
343. The Federal Reserve Board has taken the position that bank holding companies
must serve as a source of"financial and managerial strength" to their subsidiary banks.
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (1989).
344. See Klinkerman, Texas Bank Rescues Pit Wall Street Investors Against Regulators, Am.
Banker, Nov. 29, 1988, at 3, col. I (investors will view holding company debt as junk
bonds).
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IV. REGULATING TRANSITIONS: DIVERSIFICATION BY MINORITY
EQUITY INVESTMENT IN NONBANK VENTURES
This Article makes three points about the hazards of deregula-
tion of banking. First, the real hazards of deregulation are not spe-
cific abuses that can be discouraged through preventive rules, but
problems of organization, structure, and management that arise
when banks attempt to diversify into new businesses. Second, these
hazards pose a sufficient threat to bank regulatory goals to warrant a
transitional approach to deregulation. Third, fashioning such a
transitional approach may create its own new hazards. This diffi-
culty in fashioning a transitional approach to deregulation reflects
the dilemma posed at the beginning of the Article: If the conse-
quences of deregulation are unpredictable, how can the debate over
regulatory reform be resolved?
Any transitional approach to deregulation can best address this
question by allowing some controlled experimentation with deregu-
lation in order to measure the consequences of regulatory change.
In banking law reform, such an approach would test whether banks
can in fact obtain the risk-reducing benefits of diversification with-
out creating the organizational, funding, and management hazards
that may defeat any gains from deregulation and pose a risk to the
regulatory system.
Viewed in this way, a transitional approach to bank diversifica-
tion suggests itself. Ultimately, the hazards of diversification are the
product of the organizational structure of diversified banks. If
banks diversify by buying entire new businesses, they incur substan-
tial investment and integration costs. The pressures of conglomer-
ate management create incentives for inefficient resource allocation
and strategic decision-making. This suggests that diversifying by ac-
quiring new business entities may create too many risks for banks.
But there are other ways in which bahks can diversify. Banks can
buy a minority equity stake in a nonbanking business, or hold a mi-
nority interest in a joint venture with a nonbanking firm. This form
of investment enables banks to experiment with diversification while
sharing the risks of organizing, funding, and managing unfamiliar
operations.
This form of investment is not new for banks. Banks already
invest in and participate in joint ventures with nonbanking firms,
although the extent of their interests in such ventures is limited by
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existing regulation.345 These investments have not been large
enough to permit banks to experience the effects of diversification.
Allowing larger minority investments in nonbanking ventures, for
example, ranging from twenty-five to forty-nine percent of the eq-
uity of the business, would enable banks to test the consequences of
diversification.
As a transitional policy, permitting banks to diversify by making
minority investments has several advantages. First, it allows banks
to share funding and operational risks with one or more partners.
Second, it lowers the cost of investing in and divesting diverse busi-
nesses. Third, it substantially reduces information costs for banks
entering unfamiliar ventures. Fourth, it somewhat diminishes in-
centives for inefficient cross-funding and other abuses of the bank
for the benefit of nonbank operations. Finally, and perhaps most
significant, it facilitates banks' move toward more integrated organi-
zational structures after banks gain experience in managing diversi-
fication risk.346
A. Minority Ownership as a Means of Risk Sharing
Diversification by acquisition of entire businesses requires
banks to incur considerable start-up costs as well as the longer term
expense of integrating new operations into existing organizational
structures. Diversification by minority investment in nonbank ven-
tures can reduce these costs substantially. Because the risk of loss is
shared with a partner, the bank's financial commitment to the new
venture is reduced, requiring smaller capital contributions. In addi-
tion, the bank's managerial responsibility is reduced. As a substan-
tial minority participant, the bank will elect some percentage of the
board of directors and influence operating policy. But the bank will
not exercise the tight control that characterizes bank holding com-
345. The Bank Holding Company Act limits bank holding company investments in
voting equity of nonbanking ventures to five percent. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1988).
346. Significantly, banks have begun voluntarily to diversify into new businesses
through joint ventures even when regulation does not prevent sole ownership. See, e.g.,
Dresdner Bank AG, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 642 (1989) (joint venture with investment adviser
that engages only in activities permissible for a bank holding company). In one case, a
bank holding company even sold a minority stake in one of its wholly owned nonbank
ventures to an international bank. Carlson, Mitsui Bank to Buy Stake in Security Pacific Unit,
Am. Banker, June 14, 1989, at 3, col. 2. These "strategic alliances" will facilitate banks'
entry into unfamiliar markets and permit banks to share the funding costs of risky new
operations. These and other advantages of shared control may make diversification
through joint venture the preferred approach of a deregulated banking industry even
without legislation mandating this diversification strategy.
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pany management of affiliates.347
Shared control offers several benefits for the newly diversified
bank. Initially, loose control may be a more efficient organizational
approach for banks entering businesses with very different corpo-
rate cultures and operating procedures from the banking business.
Banks often underestimate the cost of integrating newly acquired
operations into their highly centralized organizational structures.348
More limited investments in nonbank ventures maintain the separa-
tion of bank and nonbank, avoiding integration problems. 49 In ad-
dition, because the nonbank operation is not wholly controlled by
the bank, public awareness of the separation of the bank from its
nonbank investment is facilitated. Depositors are less likely to iden-
tify the nonbank venture with the bank.
Thus, a minority investment achieves the legal and operational
separation of banks from their nonbank ventures that is the goal of
the firewall approach. Unlike the firewall, however, a minority in-
vestment permits mutually beneficial joint transactions between the
bank and the nonbank venture without creating the risk of inefficient
wealth transfers, conflicts of interest, and other abuses that may
threaten the bank. Because the bank is not the sole stakeholder in
the nonbank venture, transactions between the bank and nonbank
can be negotiated on an arm's-length basis. If the bank expects to
receive only part of the profits from the venture, there is no incen-
tive to enter into arrangements that benefit the nonbank venture at
the expense of the bank.
B. Minority Ownership as a Means of Facilitating
Efficient Portfolio Adjustment
Diversification by acquisition of entire businesses is a more ex-
pensive and unwieldy process than the purchase and sale of securi-
ties by portfolio investors. For this reason, firms are unlikely to hold
efficiently diversified portfolios, or to make efficient portfolio altera-
tions, by buying and selling subsidiaries.
Diversification by minority investment in nonbank ventures per-
347. See supra text accompanying notes 272-274.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 277-287.
349. Loose control can create monitoring problems. This is a concern for banks,
since regulation forces bank managers to assume enhanced responsibility for problems
in any part of the bank's operations. See supra text accompanying notes 275-276. But
when a bank is unfamiliar with its new operations, monitoring is of limited utility. The
bank may be better off relying on an experienced partner for monitoring until it gains
sufficient expertise in the new business. See infra text accompanying note 350.
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mits more efficient portfolio adjustment. Such investments allow a
broader diversification strategy than mergers or acquisitions of
whole firms. Investing in a minority block of stock requires less cash
outlay than buying an entire company. The bank may be able to
invest in several different ventures rather than buying a single busi-
ness. Further, the bank may have a wider choice of potential invest-
ments if it limits its investment to a minority interest. Many
nonbank firms may welcome an infusion of capital from a bank, as
well as the opportunity for profitable joint ventures, in exchange for
a minority equity stake. These firms may resist a takeover by the
bank.
In addition, should the bank's diversification strategy change, a
minority equity investment is easier to dispose of than a fully inte-
grated subsidiary. Even a substantial block of equity is easier to
price and to market than a wholly owned business. The bank's part-
ner is an obvious candidate to purchase the bank's interest should
the venture prove unsatisfactory to either party. The bank and non-
bank have reason to negotiate some kind of call provision in the
bank's investment contract in order to provide both parties with the
flexibility to terminate the arrangement.
C. Minority Ownership as a Means of Economizing on Information Costs
Diversification by acquisition of entire businesses can fail if the
bank underestimates the cost of learning a new business. The bank
must train personnel to understand new operations, adapt its ex-
isting technologies to new business cultures, and establish effective
monitoring systems.3 50 Diversification by minority investment in
nonbank ventures permits the bank to rely on its partner's expertise
for many day-to-day operations. Moreover, the presence of an ex-
perienced partner can facilitate the rapid education of bank person-
nel in the new business. Bank employees can be rotated to the
nonbank venture to work with experienced nonbank managers.
Of course, reliance on agents for day-to-day management cre-
ates opportunities for shirking or opportunism. The bank may have
difficulty monitoring the performance of its partner. The bank's
partner may have incentives to appropriate most of the value of
nonbank venture for itself. But similar agency problems affect
banks' wholly owned nonbank operations. If bank managers are un-
familiar with a newly acquired business, their monitoring will be in-
350. These information costs are part of the general costs of integrating new acquisi-
tions into existing management structures. See supra text accompanying notes 347-349.
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adequate. They will be forced to rely on existing personnel who
remain with the acquired company for day-to-day management.
These employees may have no loyalty to the bank. Thus, the prob-
lem of monitoring is less a function of the bank's organizational
structure than of information costs as banks enter unfamiliar
businesses.
In view of these high information costs, shared ownership of
nonbank operations may solve agency problems more effectively
than other organizational structures. The isolation of the banking
industry from other financial and nonfinancial businesses has not
just affected bankers' learning curves. Nonbankers are unfamiliar
with the special business and regulatory environment of banking. In
any joint venture between a bank and a nonbank, the nonbank must
rely on the bank's expertise as to matters peculiar to banking and
bank regulation. For example, if a bank and an insurance company
form a joint venture to market new hybrid bank-insurance products,
each partner must rely on the other's expertise as to special legal or
business considerations that affect the development and marketing
of products. Both the bank and the nonbank are in a mutually de-
pendent relationship, discouraging opportunistic behavior by either
partner.
As both partners gain expertise in the other's business, their
mutual dependence will break down. Each partner then will become
more concerned with safeguarding its own proprietary information
and skills than with gaining new information from the other. At this
point, information costs no longer provide a motive for joint con-
trol, and the arrangement may terminate. In fact, one advantage of
allowing diversification by minority investment is the ease with
which the ownership structure can be altered as banks gain experi-
ence with nonbank ventures.
D. Minority Ownership as a Means of Discouraging
Inefficient Funds Transfers
Diversification by acquisition of entire businesses may create
pressures for inefficient cross-funding and other abuses of the bank
for the benefit of nonbank affiliates. Diversification by minority in-
vestment in nonbank ventures may somewhat relieve these pres-
sures. Management should have less incentive to use bank funds to
bail out a nonbanking operation in which it has only a minority
stake. If bank funds are used to keep the nonbank venture profita-
ble, the bank can expect to receive no more than forty-nine percent
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of the profits. Yet if the bank fails, its losses cannot be shared with a
partner.
Of course, the bank will have joint operations with the nonbank
that may suffer if the nonbank venture fails. If such joint operations
are extensive, some incentives for cross-funding remain.3 5 , Yet, as
previously discussed, these joint operations provide a significant
motive for bank diversification. 52 Thus, any diversification pro-
vides a reason for inefficient cross-funding. Limiting banks to
minority investments in nonbank ventures offers some
counterincentives.
E. Minority Ownership as a Means of Facilitating Regulatory Transition
Diversification by acquisition of entire businesses poses a di-
lemma for bank regulation. Deregulation of bank product restric-
tions will leave banks free to acquire nonbanks with few if any
regulatory controls. The potential hazards of unregulated diversifi-
cation, however, make wholesale deregulation unlikely. Realists will
seek a transitional approach that permits some experimentation
with diversification without greatly increasing bank risk. The form
that this transitional approach takes will affect how, and how effec-
tively, banks diversify.
As a transitional approach, diversification by minority invest-
ment in nonbank ventures has the advantage of flexibility. Banks can
gain some experience with nonbank ventures without risking the
hazards of running nonbanking companies by themselves. If, after a
time, it appears that no hazards are likely to result from further bank
diversification, it is a simple matter to allow full ownership of non-
banking firms b, banks. Because most banks will have existing
stakes in nonbank ventures, they can simply buy out their partners
and continue to manage operations with which they have gained fa-
miliarity. 53 In contrast, if regulation is simply repealed and, in a
351. See supra text accompanying notes 251-255.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 192-204.
353. This transitional approach also offers the advantage of minimum legislative in-
volvement. Removal of statutory restrictions on bank diversification requires congres-
sional action. After that, the authority to set specific limits on bank investments in
nonbank ventures could be delegated to the bank regulators. Should bank experience
with minority investments prove satisfactory, allowing full bank ownership of nonbanks
would not require a return to Congress, but could be authorized by the regulators. In
contrast, if experience with totally unregulated diversification proves danigerous to the
banking system, only Congress can restore regulatory limits on bank investments in
nonbanks.
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year or two, the results are undesirable, it may be impossible to re-
turn to the good old days of 1990.
CONCLUSION
In banking, the only remaining barrier to deregulation is the
unpredictability of its consequences. In a regulatory environment in
which the failure of a single large bank could wipe out the entire
deposit insurance fund, the hazards that may result from deregula-
tion must be taken seriously. This Article has identified three new
subtle hazards that may make total deregulation of banking undesir-
able. These hazards suggest the need for a transitional strategy that
allows banks some experience with diversification while minimizing
opportunities for organizational, funding, and management
problems that may result in more frequent and costly bank failure.
